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A major concern ro the developing countries in the 
commodity area has been their insufficient participa-
tion in the marketing of export commodities and the 
resulting low share of the final consumer prices 
retained by them. In the light of the general assess-
ment that international trade is conducted in a 
tightly controlled market environment, especially by 
transnational corporations, the paper attempts to 
bring to light some major features of commodity 
marketing, by examining the intra-firm trade in the 
said sector, with special reference to Latin America. 
The author argues that in contrast to manufactured 
goods exports, where intra-firm trade constitutes an 
important marketing mechanism, primary export 
commodities of importance to the region do not, in 
general, involve this type of marketing practices. For 
many commodities, the paper argues, the bulk of 
world trade is handled by a relatively small number 
of transnational, multi-product trading companies. 
The author subsequently gives a theoretical exposi-
tion on the modes of operations, functions and servi-
ces of the transnational trading companies. Taking 
into consideration the peculiarities of commodity 
markets and the potential benefits that the organiza-
tional structure of a multi-product, multi-service 
trading company offers, the author asserts that this 
type of trading entity may be the kind of marketing 
organization which the countries in the region 
should aspire to develop for their own use. The poor 
performance record, examined in the paper,of inter-
national and regional entities involved in the sphere 
of commodity marketing and of the State trading 
organizations operating in the region leads the 
author to conclude that these entities should engage 
more actively in the marketing of commodities, 
either by taking their own initiatives or by becoming 
more effective co-ordinators of policies among the 
countries in and outside the region. 
"Staff member of the ECLAC International Trade and 
Development Division. This article further explores some 
conceptual considerations initially developed in a document 
of the International Trade and Development Division 
entitled Comercialización y estructura de los mercados de 
productos básicos de América latina y el Caribe 
(LC/R.508). The author would like to thank Armando Di 
Filippo for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this 
study. 
Introduction 
The well-being of the commodity sector has 
been a major concern for the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean, due to its expected 
capability to generate export earnings on a suffi-
cient scale, to finance development, and now 
especially to generate the required external 
financial resources. As a natural consequence of 
this, a substantial part of ECLAC's research 
efforts has been directed towards the examina-
tion of the specificities of the said sector and 
towards the search for solutions to the problems 
confronting it. 
As is well known, the works of Dr. Raul 
Prebisch marked a milestone in the evolution of 
international commodity policy. His works in 
the early 1950s overturned the conventional wis-
dom of classical economics that, as a consequence 
of diminishing returns on the production of 
commodities from a fixed stock of land, popula-
tion increase and capital accumulation, the prices 
of such commodities would rise over the long 
run in relation to the prices of manufactures. 
Prebisch in turn made the challenging assertion 
that the international division of labour —the 
relegation of developing countries to the status 
of producers of primary commodities and the 
appointment of the industrialized countries to 
that of producers of manufactures— contained 
in itself an asymmetric division of benefits. He 
argued that the countries in the centre, as impor-
ters and consumers of commodities, received 
benefits accruing from the lower commodity pri-
ces resulting from productivity increases. 
Moreover, he stressed that these benefits to the 
centre were further increased by others accruing 
from the retention of productivity increases in 
the manufacturing sector in their own domestic 
markets, as improvements in labour productiv-
ity were appropriated largely by organized 
labour in the form of improved incomes, with 
little consequent downward pressure on prices. 
In developing countries, on the other hand, 
the unorganized, excess labour force reduced 
its negotiating capacity, allowing a major appro-
priation of labour productivity increases in the 
form of higher profits. As the rate of profits was 
sufficiently remunerative, the business sectors of 
the periphery could augment their supply even 
further, ceding partially the fruits of technologi-
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cal progress through price reductions in world 
markets. These multiple benefits for the centre 
and impoverishing effects for the periphery, in 
his view, had self-perpetuating, differentiating 
income consequences, making the asymmetry 
even more severe. 
In his report to UNCTAD I, Prebisch (1964) 
went on to identify the trend of long-term dete-
rioration in the terms of trade of the commodity-
exporting countries as the principal external 
constraint on their development process. He 
maintained that international policy should be 
focussed on establishing commodity agreements 
with the aim of reversing the long-run down-
ward trend in the prices of the commodities 
exported by developing countries and on pro-
moting national measures by developed coun-
tries to give better access to their domestic 
markets for commodities produced by develop-
ing countries. Prebisch recognized that, for 
many products, it may not be feasible to reverse 
long-term downward price trends of the devel-
oping countries' exports by the sole means of 
intergovernmental intervention in world 
markets in the form of commodity agreements, 
especially for those products facing strong com-
petition from synthetics and substitutes. In such 
cases, he advocated the use of a compensatory 
financing mechanism to offset any deterioration 
in the terms of trade. 
In short, instead of relying solely on the free 
play of market forces to stimulate development, 
the logic of Prebisch's argument called for posi-
tive intergovernmental actions, designed specif-
ically to correct the worsening of the terms of 
trade, to improve commodity earnings pros-
pects, and to reduce short-term fluctuations in 
those earnings, especially in the interests of the 
developing countries, on a non-reciprocal basis. 
This interrelationship between commodity pol-
icy and development, formulated by Prebisch, 
has formed the basis for all subsequent commod-
ity negotiations and policy proposals debated in 
ECLAC and UNCTAD as well as in other interna-
tional fora. 
As the postwar history of international 
negotiations surrounding commodities testifies, 
Dr. Prebisch's arguments remain valid and their 
validity is further strengthened when considered 
in the light first of the very deprived state of 
the commodity sector1 and second the fact that 
his proposals, originally made more than 35 
years ago, have continuously been put on negoti-
ation tables (e.g., at the recent UNCTAD VII in 
Geneva, July 1987), though regretfully with very 
few concrete results. 
From the outset the remedial actions 
initially proposed by Prebisch have faced strong 
opposition from the developed market econo-
mies, while the socialist countries have kept an 
indifferent stance on these international initia-
tives. The lack of progress in commodity negoti-
ations reflects, to a large extent, the growing 
differences of approach between the countries of 
the South, which perceive the need for market 
intervention, and those of the North, which 
stress the need for solutions through the free 
play of market forces. The implicit assumptions 
made by the developed market economies on 
commodity markets are that they are character-
ized by perfect competition, with high factor 
mobility and the absence of market imperfec-
tions. The logic of this laissez-faire philosophy 
leads to the conclusion not only that any regula-
tion of or intervention in the free play of market 
forces would produce a misallocation of resour-
ces, but also that the problems inherent in com-
modity markets are of a cyclical rather than a 
structural nature. Furthermore, in general, the 
developed countries have viewed these remedial 
actions purely in terms of their commercial 
interests, rather than as a common endeavour 
forming part of a broad strategy of development 
and international co-operation, as Prebisch had 
envisaged. 
The perception by the South of commodity 
problems as "structural" has been reinforced ¡n 
the post-World War II period by the transna-
tionalization of this sector. Today, developing 
'Commodity prices have shown remarkably unfavourable 
trends in nominal as well as in real terms: real commodity prices 
fell by about 30% between 1980 and 1986, and prices have now 
reached a level lower than in the Great Depression (1932). The 
resulting cumulative terms-of-trade loss in the present decade has 
reached US$93 billion for the developing countries as a whole. In 
addition to this long-term deterioration of prices, other outstand-
ing features of the commodity sector are: a continuing fall in the 
share of primary commodities in world trade; a continuing decline 
in the share of developing countries in world commodity export 
earnings in contrast with the growing role of developing countries 
in world commodity imports; and structural changes depressing 
demand and increasing supply. 
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countries have to contend not only with issues 
related to sharp fluctuations in prices and deteri-
oration of their terms of trade, but also with 
unfavourable distribution of export benefits, 
particularly between the producers in the South 
and the transnational corporations (TNCs) 
which exercise a powerful influence in the mar-
keting sphere of the commodity trade. The struc-
ture of the international marketing of 
commodities, which is the subject of the present 
paper, has assumed strong oligopolistic and/or 
oligopsonistic features, with the result that a 
comparatively small number of enterprises has 
come to handle the bulk of world trade. The 
limited participation of Third World producers 
in the final consumer prices of commodity 
exports has as its counterpart the highly organ-
ized trading community. 
Restructuring the international commodity 
trading system has been one of the focal points 
of the North-South dialogue. The Integrated 
Programme for Commodities (IPC), as defined 
in UNCTAD Resolution 93 (IV), adopted by con-
sensus by the international community at Nai-
robi in 1976, specifically calls for greater 
participation by Third World producers in the 
marketing and transport of commodities and 
better access of these producers to the markets of 
the industrialized countries. Specifically, the IPC 
calls, inter alia, for the adoption of international 
measures to "improve marketing, distribution 
and transport systems for commodity exports of 
developing countries, including an increase in 
their participation in these activities and their 
earnings from them". 
During the course of continuing negotia-
tions, the mandate of Nairobi was reconfirmed 
both in UNCTAD V at Manila in 1979 and 
UNCTAD VI at Belgrade in 1983, which agreed 
on the acceleration of the formulation of inter-
national co-operation in those specific areas.2 
'In Manila, for instance, Resolution 124 (V) was adopted, 
without dissent, reaffirming to the international community the 
need to establish global co-operation, within the overall context of 
the IPC, in the field of the marketing and distribution of the 
commodity exports of developing countries. On this occasion, 
governments agreed to take into account, inter alia, the following 
specific aspects of the trading system from the Third World pers-
pective: i) improvement in market transparency, including action 
where appropriate to improve the functioning of commodity 
exchanges', ii) increased technical and financial support for the 
development of national marketing and distribution systems of 
Despite these efforts, however, there have been 
no concrete proposals for action, and to make it 
worse, the recent tendency of the industrialized 
countries regarding these issues is to slide back 
and even to question the UNCTAD mandate.1 
The above dismal record of international 
negotiations for more than a decade and the rigid 
positions of the developed countries regarding 
these issues mean that the prospects for positive 
results through the instrument of North-South 
co-operation are indeed limited. Recent expe-
rience also supports the conclusion that seeking 
effective solutions to the many problems inher-
ent in the commodity sector within a framework 
based exclusively on traditional commodity 
agreements involving both producer and consu-
mer countries will lead to little action.4 Conse-
quently, if the developing countries seek rapid 
improvements in international marketing activ-
ities, these countries must look for alternative 
solutions. The objective of this paper is to facili-
tate discussions on possible solutions to achieve 
these goals. 
Section I seeks first to identify the principal 
characteristics of the commodity markets by exa-
mining the U.S. intra-firm and related-party 
transactions. The analysis of the former is based 
primarily on the data contained in the recent 
publication, United States Direct investment 
Abroad 1982: Benchmark Survey Data, while 
that of the latter is based on a non-confidential 
but unpublished source of information made 
available by the Foreign Division of the US 
Bureau of the Census. The latter, which gives the 
1981 US related-party import trade data, is pre-
sumably the only, most up-to-date, and most 
comprehensive data source which allows an in-
depth examination of the commodity marketing 
structure, and to the knowledge of the author it 
developing countries; iii) examination of contracts, practices and 
arrangements governing the marketing of commodities; and 
¡v) elimination of barriers to fair competition between marketing 
enterprises of developed and developing countries. 
'The divergent views between the industrialized countries 
and the developing countries regarding these issues of commodity 
marketing and processing are documented in UNCTAD (1985 a, 
1985 b). 
*A summary of the events leading to this conclusion is to be 
found in ECLAC ( 1983a). 
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has not been analysed elsewhere.5 Given the 
importance of the United States in global com-
modity trade, especially for the Latin American 
region,6 the results derived from this data source 
should bring out some major characteristics of 
the trading systems surrounding commodities. 
The results obtained suggest that though the 
proportion of intra-firm (or related-party) trade 
in total US imports is high (for example, related-
party trade accounted for almost half of total 
U.S. merchandise imports in 1981), the share of 
such trade in the case of primary commodities, is, 
in general, relatively low. They also indicate that 
within commodities, the degree of "related-
ness" tends to increase in proportion to the level 
of processing. These observations taken 
together seem to indicate that the participation 
of transnational industrial firms is more marked 
in those areas where the value-added is high. 
This finding is borne out by the bird's-eye look, 
given in Section II of the marketing structure of 
individual commodities which are major interest 
'A pioneering work analysing this census data base up to 
1977 has been published by professor G, Helleiner of the Univer-
sity of Toronto (Helleiner, 1981a). The analysis made in the 
present study deals with the 1981 trade figures. More recent figures 
are not available, since the U.S. Bureau of the census has decided to 
discontinue data collection since that date. While Helleiner's work 
on the U.S. related-party trade covers all product groups from all 
countries, this study puts emphasis on the commodity sector, with 
special reference to Latin America and the Caribbean. Ideally, the 
analysis should cover similar data for other industrialized coun-
tries, but unfortunately they are not available. 
6The United States absorbs more than 30% of the Latin 
American and Caribbean commodity exports. Furthermore, in 
view of the continuing importance of commodities in U.S.-Latin 
American trade overall —they account for more than three-
quarters of the region's exports to the United States— the results 
should reveal some major features of the system of trade between 
the two groups of countries. 
to Latin America. In this section an attempt is 
also made to bring out some major factors 
responsible for such variability in the degree of 
intra-firm (or related-party) trade among differ-
ent groups of products. 
In contrast, as discussed in Section III, for 
commodities exported in a raw or semi-
processed form the participation of transna-
tional trading companies is high. A high level of 
intermediation by traders, nevertheless does not 
mean that the commodity markets approximate 
themselves to the free market operations as pos-
tulated under neoclassical theory. In this section, 
major characteristics and features of the com-
modity markets and principal agents are exam-
ined in a theoretical framework, and the 
conclusions drawn give little support for the 
wide applicability of the neoclassical theory to 
the behaviour of these markets. 
Section IV reviews the past experience of 
some producers' associations and the participa-
tion of Latin American countries in them in 
order to draw some lessons for future actions. 
The performance of Latin American State Trad-
ing Organizations (STOs) is also examined. It is 
argued that though the consulting and co-
ordinating capacities of these organizations have 
brought about some substantial improvements 
in the respective industries, the problems asso-
ciated with over-production and marketing have 
been little touched upon by them. Examination 
of these cases seems to imply that only co-
ordination and co-operation based on strong 
political will can safeguard the common inter-
ests of the respective industries, and these 
organizations should step forward to be directly 
engaged in marketing activities. 
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I 
The commercial environment for primary commodities: 
an analysis based on U.S. "intra-firm" and 
"related-party" transactions 
1. U.S. intra-firm trade 
International trade takes place within a very 
tightly controlled market environment where 
possibly 30-40% of global trade is on an intra-
firm (broadly understood as a transaction 
between entities of the same concern) or related-
party (between entities owning 5% or more of 
the total equity of the concern) basis. Another 
30% is likely to constitute State trading and a 
further share is captive in nature as a result of 
sub-contracting or long-term contract agree-
ments (UNCTAD, 1981a). Increasing rapidly in 
recent years are counter-trade schemes, which 
are estimated to account for at least 25% of 
world trade (Carey and McLean, 1986, p. 443). 
The illusionary concept of a freely competitive 
international market is narrowed down still 
further by the increasing tariff and non-tariff 
barriers imposed by both the developed and 
developing countries. Of course, some of the 
above are not mutually exclusive. 
In view of the general acknowledgement 
that the developing countries' exports are pitted 
against a relatively small and organized group of 
buyers (see, for instance, UNCTC, 1983, Chapter 
5), this sub-section tries to quantify and examine 
the degree of participation of TNCs in the mar-
keting sphere of primary commodities. The 
selection of this sector reflects its vital impor-
tance for Latin American and Caribbean econo-
mies, accounting as it does for roughly 75% 
(excluding petroleum and its products, close to 
35%) of regional merchandise exports (ECLAC, 
1984 b). 
A major point of interest is therefore the 
extent to which the transactions in commodities 
are intra-firm (or related-party) as against those 
effected at "arm's length". The term "intra-firm 
trade" indicates that which takes place between 
entities linked by direct investment,7 and 
includes trade not only between parent firms and 
wholly-owned subsidiaries, and between parents 
and majority-owned foreign affiliates (MOFAs), 
but also that between parents and minority-
owned foreign affiliates. The definition of arm's 
length trade includes all types of sales between 
two or more independent entities, for either 
immediate or forward delivery, long-term con-
tracts, or under preferential arrangements. 
The exercise of quantifying and analysing 
the trading activities of TNCs is constrained by 
lack of data. Global intra-firm data are not avail-
able, for systematic collection of such data is 
presently not undertaken by governments (see 
note 5). The United States is the only country 
which collects comprehensive information in 
this regard and publishes it (through the 
Department of Commerce) in the form of 
benchmark surveys, the latest being United 
States Direct Investment Abroad 1982 (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1985). The same 
organization also publishes annual surveys of 
the international investment position of the 
United States abroad and of U.S. affiliates of 
foreign firms operating in the U.S. The data 
contained in these documents, however, do not 
allow an examination of the marketing struc-
ture, by country and product, at a reasonably 
detailed level. 
Nonetheless, the overall implications of the 
above-mentioned U.S. publications, taken 
together with results of other studies on other 
industrialized countries, are extremely impor-
tant in that they show that TNCs are responsible 
for a large share of international trade flows. In 
the case of the United States, table 1 shows that 
in 1982 this share was approximately 40% of 
imports and 35% of exports by U.S. companies' 
affiliates abroad —being understood as entities 
owning 10% or more of the voting stock— or by 
'Direct investment is said tu exist, in the case of the United 
States, for example, when 10% or more of the voting securities of a 
foreign enterprise is owned by a U.S. person. 
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foreign parents with their affiliates in the Uni-
ted States. It has also been observed that the 
proportion of intra-firm exports in the total 
exports of the United Kingdom increased from 
29% in 1976 to 31% in 1980. The 1980 survey 
for Japan also reveals that intra-firm trade cor-
responded to 26% and 25% of total national 
exports and imports, respectively, of that year 
(Japan, MITI, 1983, table 55). A sample of the 
world's largest industrial enterprises for 1977 
showed that one-third of all parent company 
exports consisted of intra-firm sales, with the 
share varying from 45% for U.S. firms, to 30% 
for those based in Western Europe and 17% for 
Japanese firms (Dunning and Pearce, 1981). 
1
 Elaborating further exclusively on the intra-
firm trade of the United States, of total U.S. 
imports associated with U.S. TNCs amounting to 
US$120.8 billion in 1982: i) imports shipped by 
foreign affiliates to U.S. parents came to 
US$41.6 billion (34.4%); ii) imports shipped by 
foreign affiliates to unaffiliated U.S. entities 
were US$9.8 billion (8.1%); and iii) imports 
shipped by unaffiliated foreigners to U.S. par-
ents amounted to US$69.4 billion (57.5%). 
Among the three categories, only group i) falls 
under the definition and constitutes part of U.S. 
intra-firm trade. Within this group, the U.S. 
1982 benchmark survey provides data on U.S. 
imports shipped by MOFAs to U.S. parents at a 
one or two digit Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) level. United States 
imports shipped by MOFAs were US$38.5 bil-
lion. In table 2, these intra-firm trade figures are 
contrasted with the total imports of correspond-
ing SITC groupings in order to assess the relative 
importance of intra-firm trade within and across 
different sectors. 
Looking at the data by countries of affiliates, 
as inthe table, 32.3% of U.S. imports shipped by 
MOFAs were petroleum and its products, 27.4% 
were road motor vehicles and parts, and 22.1% 
were machinery. Imports of other products were 
relatively small. By region of MOFAs, imports 
from developed countries exceeded those from 
developing countries, overall as well as in such 
categories as food, petroleum and machinery. 
In relation to the total U.S. import values of 
individual SITC groupings, imports from MOFAs 
to U.S. parents were most pronounced in road 
vehicles and parts (32.9%), machinery (20.9%), 
and petroleum and products (18.4%). For the 
developing regions as well, these three sectors 
were those which showed a high intra-firm trade 
Table 1 
INTRA-FIRM TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1982 
(Billions of dollars) 
Imports Exports 
1. Imports from affiliated foreign firms 
2. Imports from foreign affiliates of US parents 
3. Total imports from affiliates (1+2) 
4. Overlap between 1 and 2 
5. Total US merchandise imports 
6. Percentage of affiliated imports (3-4)/5 
83.4 1. Exports to affiliated foreign firms 60.2 
41.6 2. Exports to foreign affiliates of US parents 46.6 
125.9 3. Total exports to affiliates (1+2) 106.8 
(30-35) 4. Overlap between 1 and 2 (30-35) 
243.9 5. Total US merchandise exports 212.3 
37.3-39.3 6. Percentage of affiliated exports (3-4)/5 33.8-36.2 
Source: Item 1: US Department of Commerce (1984, table 8). In this survey, a US affiliate is a US business enterprise in which there is foreign 
direct investment - that is, a single foreign person owns or controls, directly or indirectly, 10% or more of the voting securities 
if an incorporated business enterprise or an equivalent interest if an unincorporated business enterprise. 
2: US Department of Commerce (1985 b, table 3). Affiliate is defined as "ownership directly or indirectly by one US person of 
10# or more of the voting securities of an incorporated foreign business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an 
unincorporated foreign business enterprise". 
3: Total US imports are on a Census basis and represent transaction values, f.a.s. the foreign port of exportation. Similarly, total 
US exports are on a Census basis and represent transaction values, f.a.s. the US port of exportation. 
4: As the Department of Commerce acknowledges, exports and imports by US affiliates of foreign firms (item 1) cannot be 
simply added to US exports and imports associated with US parents (item 2), due to duplication in the two data sets. To the 
extent that US affiliates of foreign firms in turn had affiliates abroad, they would have been considered the US parents of those 
foreign affiliates in the 1982 annual survey. A highly preliminary match between the companies reported in both surveys 
indicated that the overlap for exports and imports was sizeable, roughly USÎ30-35 billion each (Department of Commerce, 
1985 c). 
Table 2 
IMPORTANCE OF US IMPORTS SHIPPED BY MOFA's TO US PARENTS AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF OVERALL US IMPORTS, BY COUNTRY OF AFFILIATES AND BY PRODUCTS, 1982° 
(Millions of dollars) 
Country of affiliate 
Imports originating from: 
Developed countries 
Total imports (i) 
By MOFA's (ii) 
(i i)/(i) (%) 
Canada 
Total imports (i) 
By MOFA's (ii) 
(i i)/(i) (%) 
EEC (10 countries) 
Total imports (i) 
By MOFA's (ii) 
(«) / ( i ) (%) 
Japan 
Total imports (i) 
By MOFA's (ii) 
(ii)/(i) {%) 
Total imports from all 
countries (i) 
Imports by MOFA's, all 
countries (ü) 














































































































































































































































Table 2 (concluded) 
Country of affiliate 
Imports originating from: 
Developing countries 
Total imports (i) 
By MOFA's (ii) 
(i i)/(i) (%) 
Latin America 
Total imports (i) 
By MOFA's (ii) 
(i i)/(i) (%) 
Africa 
Total imports (i) 
By MOFA's (ii) 
(i i)/(i) (%) 
Asia 
Total imports (i) 
By MOFA's (ii) 




























































































































































































Source: Figures for MOFA's are taken from US Department of Commerce (1985 b). Trade figures by SITC grouping are from United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics. 
" In this table, data for affiliates are only for non-bank affiliates of non-bank parents. MOFA's (Majority Owned Foreign Affiliates) are defined as affiliates owned more than 50% by all US 
parents combined 
Excludes centrally planned economies. 
"The sum of the three developing regions does not add up to the coral of developing countries, due to the exclusion of Oceania. 
Suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies. 
'Less than $500 000 (+/-) or 50 employees. 
Imports shipped by MOFA's exceed the overall total, due probably to reporters' incorrect classification of tranportation equipment, parts and accessories. 
-sa-
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Table 3 
US RELATED-PARTY TRADE AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORTS 














Animal and vegetable products 
Wood and paper; printed matter 
Textile and textile products 
Chemicals and related products 
Non-metallic minerals and 
products thereof 
Metals and metal products 
Specified products; miscella-
























































Source: Data provided by the Foreign Trade Division of the US Bureau of the Census. 
ratio. Though it was not possible to make a direct 
comparison, due to the manner in which the 
SITC groupings were aggregated by the Depart-
ment of Commerce, those categories usually 
understood to constitute primary commodities 
(SITC 0-4; 68) can be said to have a relatively low 
intra-firm ratio. Latin America does not differ 
significantly from other developing regions in 
terms of relative sectoral importance in the 
intra-firm import trade of the United States. 
2. U.S. related-party trade (RPT) 
For an examination by individual country and at 
a much more disaggregated product level, the 
data employed below are those of the Foreign 
Trade Division of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
and show the value and volume of U.S. imports, 
within each individual tariff classification of the 
U.S. tariff schedule (TSUS) and from each coun-
try of origin, which originate from "related par-
ties". The definition of a "related party" is a firm 
in which 5% or more of the voting stock is 
owned by the other party with which it trades. 
The coverage is for both U.S. firms and for firms 
based outside the United States. 
Examination of the 1981 figures indicates 
that, for that particular year, 49.0% of total U.S. 
merchandise imports were transacted in the 
form of RPT (table 3). This coincides roughly 
with the figures of 45.0% and 48.8% for 1975 
and 1977 respectively given in the studies by 
Helleiner (1979; 1981), though indicating a 
slight increasing trend over the years. The over-
all figure also seems to be in conformity with the 
results obtained from the 1982 benchmark sur-
vey just mentioned above: a lower intra-firm 
import ratio of roughly 40% (table 1) could be 
explained by the difference in definition of the 
coverage of capital ownership between RPT and 
direct investment (10% or more of the voting 
securities of a foreign enterprise owned by a U.S. 
entity). The wide variations in RPT ratios 
observed among major product groups, even at 
the most aggregated level, are also in accordance 
with the results of the 1982 benchmark study. In 
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the case of RPT ratios, in general, high ratios 
were observed for manufactured goods, espe-
cially in the heavy industrial sectors, while 
animal and vegetable products and non-metallic 
minerals registered a relatively low RPT coeffi-
cient. An exception to the above was textiles and 
their products. Two groups (chemicals, and 
metals and their products) were most dominant 
in this respect, accounting for 74.1% of total 
imports and 87.8% of the RPT total. 
RPT can be disaggregated further along the 
TSUS sub-groupings and compared with total 
U.S. imports, as shown in table 4. It should be 
noted first that within each schedule, there was a 
large variation from product to product, in the 
agricultural as well as the mineral and metal 
sectors. Though generalization is difficult, the 
RPT rose as a proportion of the total as one 
moved from primary products, excluding petro-
leum, to semi-manufactures. Within primary 
commodities, the degree of "related-ness" 
tended to increase in accordance with the level of 
processing/manufacturing,8 an aspect to be 
further elaborated later on in the paper. A large 
number of commodities which are of major 
interest to the Latin American region showed an 
extremely low RPT ratio, as in the cases of hides 
and skins, sugar, beverages, cereals, spices and 
oilseeds. 
The order of absolute RPT values at the 
sub-grouping level, was led by petroleum, fol-
lowed by road vehicles; machinery for industrial 
use; electrical machinery; apparatus and 
appliances; iron and steel; precision apparatus; 
power generating machinery; general industrial 
machinery; office machines and automatic data 
processing equipment, etc. The manufacturing 
sectors mentioned herein were those in which 
high absolute import values were accompanied 
by high RPT ratios. As a primary commodity, 
This conclusion accords well with the findings by Helleiner 
on the earlier years. He indicated that this general pattern was 
found for the 1977 imports from both the Third World and OECD 
members. As he concluded, "other things being equal, one can 
expect increases in the role of related-party trade as industrializa-
tion proceeds in the Third World and the relative importance of 
their manufactured goods trade continues to rise". Mainly due to 
the interrelationship between RPT and manufacturing, Helleiner 
found that the relative importance of RPT seems to be much 
greater in the imports from the OECD countries than in the case of 
imports from the developing countries. 
only aluminium exceeded the 1 billion dollar 
mark. 
Lastly, on the basis of the same data it is 
possible to examine the degree of RPT in prim-
ary commodities with special reference to Latin 
America and the Caribbean, as shown in 
table 5.9 In this exercise, the product was ana-
lysed at a 7-digit TSUS, on the assumption that 
further disaggregation would shed more light on 
the participation of TNCs in the international 
marketing of commodities. Furthermore, indi-
vidual commodities were grouped together and 
compared in accordance with their degrees of 
processing. Products selected here were of major 
export interest to the region. 
One of the principal findings of this exercise 
was that in some commodities (such as bauxi-
te/alumina/aluminium and bananas) the RPT 
ratio was extremely high, while in others, it was 
nearly non-existent (as in sugar) or very low (in 
the case of cocoa beans and coffee beans). Look-
ing at the commodity sector alone, however, it 
can be concluded that those items of importance 
to the region registered, with some exceptions, 
low RPT ratios. This seems to suggest that the 
number of commodities which display total inte-
gration from production to the last stage of 
external marketing is not large. 
The above analysis also highlights the point 
that within a given commodity group (with 
some exceptions) a higher RPT ratio is observed 
for products with a higher level of processing, 
and thus higher value-added. Good examples of 
this are the product chains of: i) cocoa beans/co-
coa butter/chocolate; ii) live animals/meat/ 
meat preparations; iii) hides and skins/foot-
wear; iv) timber/lumber/furniture; v) leaf 
tobacco/manufactured tobacco; and vi) some 
mineral ores/metals, as in the case of copper and 
tin. What may be inferred from this is that 
transnational industrials are involved and prac-
tice most effective market control in the down-
stream processing activities where the 
value-added is high. Those high value-added 
activities usually involve the use of brand names, 
heavy advertising and product differentiation, as 
9Due to the very detailed nature of the information contained 
in the data provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the figures 
are aggregated at the regional level. For figures at the individual 
tariff schedule level and by country, see ECLAC (1986 c, table 3)-
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Table 4 
US IMPORT STRUCTURE: RELATED-PARTY TRANSACTIONS 










103C and D 
103E 
103 





















112A and B 








Other meat and meat preparations 
Meat and meat preparations 
Fish, fresh, chilled or frozen 
Fish, dried, salted 
Fish, prepared or preserved 
Crustaceans and molluscs, 
prepared or preserved 
Fish and fish preparations 
Milk and cream 
Butter and fresh or sour cream 
containing over 4 5 % butterfat 
Cheese and curd 
Birds' eggs and birds' egg 
albumen and yolks 
Dairy products and eggs 
Hides and skins (except furskins), 
undressed, raw or cured 
Furskins 
Hides, skins and furskins, 
undressed, raw or cured 
Plants, live 
Seeds of plants 
Plants and their seeds 
Barley, buckwheat, corn, sorghum, oats, 
rice, rye, wheat, starches 
Vegetables, fresh, frozen or temporarily 
preserved, and dried leguminous 
vegetables, roots and tubers 
Fruits and nuts, fresh or dried, 
prepared or preserved 
Sugar, sirups, molasses and honey 
Cocoa beans, butter, powder 
and chocolate 
Other food preparations containing 
cocoa or chocolate 
Sugar, mollasses, honey; cocoa and 
its products 
Coffee, tea, mate 
Spices 





Tobacco and its manufactures 
Oilseeds, oil nuts and oil 
kernels, non-specified 
Cereal preparations and 







1 990 274 
1 993 645 
1 282 896 
81 440 
230 901 
1 333 155 














1 605 124 
2 306 812 
876 212 
123 759 
3 306 783 
3 019 422 
136 033 
3 155 456 
656 672 
2 338 086 
2 668 024 
184 140 
558 039 
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Table 4 (continued 1) 
Product 
sub-



























303C and D 











405, 406, 407 







502A and B 
Animal and vegetable products 
Wood, lumber, cork 
Pulp and paper 
Books, printed matter 
Wood and paper; printed matter 
Cotton fibre, waste, yarn 
Other textile fibres, waste, yarn, abaca, 
flax, hemp sisal, henequén, jute, etc. 
Wool and other animal hair and yarn 
Raw silk, yarn 
Manrhade fibres 
Other yarns 
Textile fibres, waste, yarn 
Cordage, twine 
Cotton fabrics 
Fabrics, vegetable fibres 
Woven fabrics, silk, wool 
Woven fabrics, manmade fibres 
Textile fabrics 
Knitfabrics of textile fibres, narrow 
fabrics, lace, netting, etc., special 
textile fabrics and related products 
Floor coverings, tapestries, and particles 
of vegetable plaiting materials 
Wearing apparel and accessories 
Bags, ornaments, ribbons, 
rags, wipenings 
Textile fibres and textile products 
Organic chemicals and related products 
Inorganic chemicals and related products 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 
Synthetic resins; and rubber and 
plastics materials 
Essential oils and perfume 
materials, toilet, polishing and 
cleansing preparations 
Crude petroleum, petroleum products 
Fertilizers, manufactured 
Explosives 
Animal and vegetable oils and fats, 
processed, fatty acids, waxes of 
animal, vegetable or mineral origin 
Chemicals and related products 
Crude materials, graphite, cement, 
limestone, marble, stone, mica, asbestos; 
natural abrasives, crude or processed, 
including industrial diamonds, natural 
or synthetic, other precious and 
semi-precious stones 
Clay and refractory 
construction materials 
20 260 724 
3 482 229 
5 559 341 
605 633 













1 509 741 
310 552 
3 440 047 
426 074 
1 824 329 
154 453 



































6 512 782 
268 647 
9 779 948 
2 141 409 
4 067 633 
711 178 
1 181 082 
813 493 
80 337 109 
1 393 909 
20 720 
417 575 




1 376 598 
1 133 549 
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Table 4 (continued 2) 
Product 
sub-










(B) / (A) 
(%) 
502C, D Pottery, porcelain or china household 
and E ware, earthenware or stoneware, ceramic, 
and china ornamental articles 
503 Glass, glassware, and articles thereof 
Schedule 5 Non-metallic minerals and products 
thereof 
601 Non-ferrous metals, ores 
602A Precious metals, inch gold and silver 
602B Iron and steel, various types and 
forms 
602C Copper and copper alloys, wrought 
and unwrought, waste and scrap, 
and related products 
602D Aluminium and aluminium alloys, 
wrought and unwrought, waste and 
scrap, and related products 
602E Nickel and nickel alloys, wrought 
and unwrought, waste and scrap, 
and related products 
602F Tin and tin alloys, wrought and 
unwrought, waste and scrap and 
related products 
602G head and lead alloys, wrought and 
unwrought, waste and scrap, 
and related products 
602H Zinc and zinc alloys, wrought and 
unwrought, waste and scrap, 
and related products 
602 I, J Other metals and alloys, 
and K waste and scrap, and related products 
602 Non-ferrous metals 
603 Manufactures of metal 
604A Power generating machinery and 
equipment, general industrial 
machinery and equipment 
604B Mechanical handling equipment 
604C Agricultural and horticultural 
machinery (except tractors), 
food processing machinery 
604D Printing and bookbinding 
machinery and parts thereof 
604E Textile machinery; washing, 
bleaching, dying 
604F Metal working machinery, machine tools 
604G Office machines and automatic data 
processing equipment 
604H Shoe machinery, machinery for 
sorting, molding, cigarette making, 
audio-players, radios, etc. 
604J Balls, ball bearings, valves, etc. 
604 Machinery of industrial use 
780 264 
664 104 
5 873 604 
2 372 504 
3 859 783 
11 260 776 
1 151 028 







1 099 116 
953 087 
508 053 
7 330 680 
213 198 


















20 456 490 
5 658 425 
6 342 651 




2 268 852 
3 492 998 
1 766 375 
1 554 368 
19 422 528 
36 516 
10 072 509 
1 140 220 





1 206 397 
2 565 045 
857 068 
779 448 
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Table 4 (concluded) 
Product 
sub-




































706, 707, 708 
709, and 710 
711 
712 
713 and 714 
Schedule 7 
801, 802, 803 
804, 805, 806 
Schedule 8 
901, 902, 903, 
904, 905 
Schedule 9 
SCH 1 - 9 
Electrical machinery, apparatus 
and appliances 
Road vehicles, other transport 
equipment 
Metals and metal products 
Footwear 
Headwear of all materials 
Gloves of textile fibres, rubber, plastic 
Travel goods, handbags 
Various wearing articles 
Contact lenses, optical lenses 
Medical equipment and apparatus 
Professional and scientific instruments 
Watches and clocks 
Photographic apparatus and equipment 
Motion-picture film, phonograph 
records, recorded tapes, etc. 
Precision apparatus and equipment 
Musical instruments, cases, parts 
Furniture 
Floor coverings 
Furniture and floor coverings 
Firearms, munitions, cartridges 
Fishing equipment 
Bicycles, baby carriages 
Sporting equipment 
Toys 
Sporting goods and toys 
Other manufactured 
articles 
Art works, antiques 
Rubber manufactures 
Miscellaneous 
Specified products; miscellaneous 
and non-enumerated products 
US goods returned, re-imported goods 
for public use and institutions 
Special classification provision 
Miscellaneous 
Appendix to the tariff schedules 
Total 
11 160 255 
31 776 287 
97 127 166 




3 802 056 
779 071 
672 467 
1 187 876 
1 250 716 
1 463 403 
393 874 
5 687 406 
262 852 
1 256 706 
36 059 




1 140 403 
862 303 
2 639 897 
1 642 567 
725 809 
2 784 515 
828 916 
20 178 878 
4 687 375 
4 687 375 
362 945 
362 945 
259 011 948 
8 048 663 











1 006 109 
228 781 













1 515 538 
141 036 
6 726 712 
2 046 316 
2 046 316 
340 709 
340 709 




































Source; Data provided by the Foreign Trade Division of the US Bureau of the Census. 
INTERNATIONAL PRIMARY COMMODITY MARKETING AND LATIN AMERICA / M. Kuwayama 91 
Table 5 
STRUCTURE OF US PRIMARY COMMODITY IMPORTS: RELATED-PARTY 
TRADE, BY TSUS AND BY REGION, 1981 
TSUS No. Product description 
(Thousands vf dollars) 
Total import value (A) 
Latin All 
America countries 






























































Beef with bone, fresh, chilled 
Beef without bone, fresh, chilled, frozen 
Corned beef 
Shrimps and prawns, shell-on 
Cattle hides, ray or cured 
Bovine leather, not fancy, n.s.p 
Footwear, leather 
Bananas, fresh 
Cane or beet sugar, syrup, molasses, n.s.p 
Cocoa beans 
C h (KO la te, unsweetened 
Cocoa butter 
Coffee, crude 
Coffee, roasted or ground 
Soluble or instant coffee, no additives 
Orange ¡nice, concentrated 
Cigarette leaf tobacco, not stemmed 
Cigar leaf scrap tobacco 
Cigars 
Tobacco, manufactured or not 
Hardwood logs and timber 
Lumber, balsa/teak, mahogany and others 
Hardwood moldings, carvings, etc. 
Articles of wood, n.s.p. 
Hardwood veneers, plywood 
Wooden chairs, furniture and parts 
Raw cotton, n.s.p. 
Cotton yarn, hot bleached 
Sisal and henequén, waste 
Wool finer than 58s 
Crude bauxite 
Aluminium oxide (alumina) 
Aluminium, unwrought, not alloyed 
Aluminium, unwrought, alloyed 
Aluminium, sheets and strip 




Lead ore, initially treated 
Lead, unwrought, not alloyed 
Zinc ore, initially treated 
Zinc, unwrought, not alloyed 
Copper ore, initially treated 
Copper, unwrought, not alloyed 
Tin, unwrought, not alloyed 








708 956 . 













































1 590 007 
709 496 















































































































































































































Source: Data provided by the Foreign Trade Division of the US Bureau of the Census. 
"This group includes 7002980, 7003515, 7003530, 7004510, 7004540, 7004560. 
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in the case of most food and beverage markets 
like those of chocolate, processed tea or coffee. 
The degree of RPT in Latin American com-
modity exports to the United States was not 
significantly different from that in exports from 
all origins. Exceptions included processed wood 
products, tungsten ore, lead and zinc, in which 
the Latin American figure was higher. In the 
case of petroleum, the Latin American ratio was 
substantially lower than the corresponding one 
for the world. 
What can be concluded from the preceding 
analysis is that though intra-firm trade (or RPT) 
is frequently found in industries or sectors in 
which there is a high degree of market concen-
tration, it is not necessarily directly correlated 
with it. A high concentration in production/refi-
ning/processing does not necessarily imply an 
accordingly high intra-firm (or RPT) ratio. 
The observations made up to now raise sev-
eral interesting questions, namely: i) what fac-
tors are responsible for the high RPTs in 
manufactures and low RPTs for primary com-
modities in general? and ¡i) what are the reasons 
for the varying RPT ratios among different com-
modities? In short, an important question is why 
the TNCs, trading or manufacturing alike, decide 
to employ intra-firm trade (or RPT) rather than 
arm's-length trading in some commodities and 
not in others. 
While bearing in mind the risks involved in 
generalizing issues of this nature, it may be said 
that TNCs are more likely to seek to internalize 
trade operations under the form of intra-firm 
trading when one or more of the following fac-
tors are of importance:10 
i) When intermediate inputs are highly spe-
cific to the firm in terms of quality, specifications 
and technology, as in the case of many manufac-
tured goods, or of bauxite; 
ü) When there are substantial marketing 
and after-sale requirements for finished product 
sales, as is the case in many manufactured pro-
ducts, but less so in primary commodities; 
iii) When there are risks of intermediate 
input supply disruptions; 
l0Some of these points are mentioned in Helleiner (1981a, 
p. 54). 
iv) When there are problems of perishabil-
ity or limited storability of the product, as exem-
plified by bananas, which requires very timely 
co-ordination between production and market-
ing across different national boundaries; 
v) When there is a protective umbrella 
against rising prices which allows a rise in raw 
material costs to be passed on to the final pro-
duct price without too much difficulty. For 
instance, the share of bauxite in the final price of 
aluminium is very low, so that a large increase in 
bauxite prices will not affect too much the final 
price of aluminium. On the other hand, as in the 
case of the majority of commodities, the share of 
raw material costs is high and this produces a 
higher risk, thereby inducing a higher level of 
intermediation (such as that offered by trading 
companies) in order to reduce the risks arising 
from sudden price changes; 
vi) When there is weak tax or exchange con-
trol which increases the potential for transfer 
pricing. 
The concept of "transaction costs" is helpful 
in explaining the major differences in marketing 
between commodities and manufactured goods. 
These are the costs which are incurred by the 
transacting parties in a market exchange in 
order to enforce their exclusive rights to the 
assets or services being traded. R.H. Coase 
(1937) long ago pointed out that the operation 
of the market is not costless, and that internali-
zation of certain functions, instead of arm's-
length transactions, is a rationale for creating a 
firm. Internalization brings about efficiency in 
such areas of production as transaction, contract-
ing and enforcing contracts. The brokerage cost 
of finding a correct price, the cost of defining the 
obligations of parties in a contract, the risk of 
scheduling and related input costs, and costs 
related to foreign exchange in the case of foreign 
trade are not insignificant. Reduction of these 
costs and of the risk and uncertainty associated 
with them is a justification for vertical integra-
tion. By integration, the organization can occa-
sionally use administrative fiats to set internal 
prices, and can control the production and mar-
keting of intermediate products. 
Business by fiat creates opportunities for 
price maneuverability. Predatory pricing, price 
discrimination and transfer pricing are often-
discussed incentives for integration on the part 
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of the manufacturer. For the trading company 
also, integration in the form of a worldwide 
subsidiary/branch office representative network 
not only facilitates information flows but also 
increases room for such tactics. 
In addition to administrative fiat, there are 
two other levels of transacting: the price mecha-
nism and contracts. J.C. McManus (1972), in 
attempting to describe the various forms of for-
eign business activities by a firm, explains that 
"some dimensions of interdependence, those in 
which transacting costs are relatively low, will be 
constrained by the price mechanism. For others, 
the members of the set may choose to constrain 
their actions by contractual arrangements. Some 
combination of these two means of constraining 
the actions of individual producers is the alterna-
tive to the establishment of an international 
firm". 
As noted in the preceding section, the marketing 
systems for primary commodities are of great 
variety: some rely on arm's-length type opera-
tions, others are traded intra-firm, while others 
adopt a mixture of the two. The complexity of 
the trade structure can be confirmed by the fol-
lowing illustration, at the individual product 
level. 
Most bauxite is traded intra-firm —some 
three-quarters of all bauxite mined is refined 
within corporate systems11 or at least by related 
parties. The remainder is sold under long-term 
contracts, with only small amounts left for the 
spot market. Similarly, in the case of alumina, 
only some 26-30% is traded outside integrated 
company systems and only 5-8% is sold in the 
spot market (Metal Bulletin, 1986). Therefore, 
only a small fraction of the total volume traded is 
exposed to —and thus responsive to— the fluc-
tuations of the "freeness" of the spot market. 
"Outside the centrally planned economies, the industry con-
tinues to be dominated by the "Big Six": the Aluminum Company 
of America (ALCOA), Alusuisse.Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhmann, Alean 
Aluminum Ltd,, Reynolds Metals, and Kaiser Aluminum and 
Chemical Corporation. 
In conjunction with this clarification, it is 
important to note that among the many areas of 
commodity trading, intermediation is most 
marked in transacting materials whose quality 
and quantity can be relatively easily specified by a 
contract, Such materials include raw cotton, 
grains, sugar, soybeans and their products, coal, 
copper, tin, rubber, wool, etc. These commodi-
ties also require little or no servicing or after-
care once they are handed over to the respective 
buyers. In contrast to other areas (e.g., importa-
tion of technology), the brokerage cost of finding 
a correct price and the cost of contract enforce-
ment are relatively minor. Within the same con-
text, W.P. Rapp (1976) argues that the general 
tendency in foreign trade today is for large trad-
ing companies to deal with large producers 
because there is a minimum desirable marketing 
scale for each transaction. 
However, within the same group, aluminium 
ingots have both a producer price and a London 
Metal Exchange (LME) and a New York Com-
modity Exchange (COMEX) price. As a matter of 
fact, the quotations on the exchanges have 
replaced the role of the producers' price, eg., that 
of ALCAN, which for a long period of time was 
considered as the market price of aluminium.12 
Iron ore exhibits a high concentration on 
both the buyer and the seller sides, as in bauxite, 
but prices are determined through a wide variety 
of mechanisms, ranging from bilateral negotia-
tions on long-term contracts to transfer pric-
ing.11 Even short-term contracts (usually for one 
l2One of the factors contributing greatly to the expansion of 
operations on the commodity exchanges in recent years, (in the 
cases of aluminium, nickel, copper and petroleum, for example) 
has been the great short-term swings in prices which made it 
increasingly difficult for producers to maintain long-established 
systems of administered prices on world markets. 
"Long-term contracts are estimated to cover 70% of the 
international trade of iron ore. Western European long-term con-
tracts are believed to cover about 40% of that region's iron ore 
import requirements, while Japan had already completed in 1976 
arrangements to import all the iron ore it will need throughout the 
1980's (Radetzki. 1980). 
II 
Market structure and price determination 
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year) are often regularly renewed in such a way 
that relationships are built up which may extend 
over decades. In the case of this mineral, trading 
firms or trading arms of the steel companies are 
known to be the principal marketing agents. It is 
estimated that only about one-third, or even less, 
of world trade in this commodity is transacted in 
the "free" sector of the world market, i.e., with-
out being covered by special marketing arrange-
ments (Radetzki, 1980). 
The frequency of long-term contracts for 
iron ore derives from the size of the investments 
required to mine it and the ensuing need to 
guarantee that the ore will be sold for a number 
of years, in order to ensure the company's sol-
vency. Contracts negotiated between buyers in 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the Brazi-
lian State mining company (CVRD), those 
between Japanese buyers and the Brazilian 
CVRD, and those between Japanese buyers and 
Australian mines normally act as "price setters" 
for the international market in iron ore 
(UNCTAD, 1984 i). 
In the case of metallic copper, whether 
refined or unrefined, exports consist mainly of 
arm's-length transactions, and whether long- or 
short-term, all copper contracts are priced at 
some LME-related value over which a single 
trader rarely exercises a decisive influence. 
Although there is a high degree of vertical inte-
gration in the copper industry, with a few excep-
tions integration in copper is confined within 
national boundaries and the largest part of inter-
national trade takes place between independent 
entities. Even though LME and COMEX handle 
only 5-10% of the total trade in copper, their 
quotations act as the peg on which a much larger 
volume of copper contracts are based. Though 
the prices for sales of unrefined copper are LME-
based, the determination of toll costs (deduc-
tions to cover the cost of processing) gives the 
buyers ample opportunities to use their nego-
tiating power. Efforts on the part of developing 
country copper producers to integrate as far as 
the refining stage may be explained by their 
desire to overcome the existing imbalance in 
these respects. Even though there has been an 
increase in direct sales from countries in which 
national interests have assumed control over 
marketing,14 an important part of their sales is 
still handled by established agents or distributors 
in the major copper consuming countries 
(UNCTAD, 1984 h). 
With regard to tin, since mining and smelt-
ing operations have been mostly independently 
owned, the marketing is generally done among 
independent entities. The bulk of tin concen-
trates traded internationally is handled either 
directly by the producers or indirectly through 
trading companies. The bulk of trade in metal 
has traditionally been conducted by international 
traders, and their role as intermediaries is more 
pronounced in metal than in concentrates, 
mainly due to the diversified use of this metal at 
the consumer end (UNCTAD, 1984 j). The com-
modity exchanges which transact metals have 
played an important role in the price determina-
tion of tin. However, owing to the failure of 
arduous negotiations to secure a breakthrough in 
solving the tin crisis which has existed since 
October 1985, LME decided to suspend transac-
tions of this metal. Considering the large size 
and great influence of LME's operations before 
the crisis (the Kuala Lumpur Tin Market in 
Malaysia was believed to represent about 20% of 
the international tin market, while LME had an 
even more direct influence), it can be concluded 
that this product has lost an important centre for 
price determination. 
For lead and zinc, there is a dual price struc-
ture composed of the LME price and the produc-
ers' price. With respect to zinc, the prices 
published in Metal Bulletin, based in London, 
and Metal Week, based in New York, are taken 
as reference prices for contracts. For this metal, 
producers' prices, such as the European Producer 
Price, have a wide application and this is espe-
cially true for concentrates. The United States 
Producer Price has its validity in that country's 
own domestic market. In comparison with lead, 
zinc producers have little degree of forward lin-
kage, so that they sell their production directly to 
consumers: a situation which has given rise to 
various producers' price systems. Due to this 
predominance of producers' prices, the propor-
tion of transactions actually finalized at LME for 
MThe Chilean Copper Corporation (CODELCO) sells its 
copper directly through its selling offices in London, New York, 
and Sao Paulo and a network of agents in other markets. The direct 
sales effort of CODELCO is reflected in the fact that only 10-20% of 
Chilean copper is handled by international agents. 
INTERNATIONAL PRIMARY COMMODITY MARKETING AND LATIN AMERICA / M. Kuwaya; 95 
zinc is thought to be smaller than for lead or 
copper. 
Among agricultural products, there are a 
group of commodities where market conditions 
seemingly approximate to those assumed by per-
fect competition: there are a large number of 
sellers and buyers, no one of which can, to a large 
extent, influence the price by their own actions. 
This appears to hold true for commodities sold 
by auction (e.g., tea and tobacco), but the price 
formation at the auction could be substantially 
influenced by the actions of a limited number of 
large-scale buyers. In most cases, these buyers 
have capital links with the world-leading pro-
cessing firms of the developed market econo-
mies (UNCTAD, 1978; 1984 f). Contrary to what 
is generally assumed, these products face a high 
degree of oligopoly, and the transnational pro-
cessing/manufacturing firms have achieved 
tight control from the stage of production to 
retailing in the major consuming markets. A 
handful of large TNCs control the world market 
through, inter alia, partial or total ownership of 
plantations, ownership relations with brokers, 
concentration of buying at auctions, ownership 
of processing facilities, dominant shares in 
major consuming markets, and increased market 
power through product differentiation and 
advertising. Also included in this category of 
products are bananas, which display probably 
the highest level of integration by TNCs in pro-
duction and marketing activities (FAO, 1986). 
For other agricultural commodities (e.g., cof-
fee, cocoa, sugar, oilseeds and cotton), operations 
in futures markets assume particular impor-
tance. The quotations in these markets are not 
only heavily influenced by prevailing supply and 
demand situations but also by hedging and spe-
culative activities of the marketing and producer 
entities involved and especially by the selling/ 
purchasing operations of large trading compan-
ies. All these products are highly sensitive to 
future expectations, thus allowing traders with 
"inside" knowledge to reap large speculative 
gains. As the raw material price looms high in 
the price of the final consumer product in these 
commodities, in order to avoid disproportionate 
risks in holding large stocks at hand, the major 
processors rely heavily on traders for the acquisi-
tion of the raw materials and for their hedging at 
commodity exchanges. Markets for meat, sugar, 
and grains, which all display high participation 
of large trading companies in the international 
markets, are composed of various fragmented 
national markets, where preferential channels 
or special arrangements, tariff and non-tariff 
barriers or export and production subsidies are 
important determinants of the direction of 
trade. 
Ill 
Marketing agents and major characteristics 
of primary commodity markets 
1. Principal marketing agents 
The foregoing analysis seems to suggest that for 
many primary commodities, the bulk of world 
trade is handled by entities other than transna-
tional industrials. Various studies on the issue of 
commodity trading, emphasize instead the 
importance of a relatively small number of mul-
tinational, multi-product trading companies 
which are interposed between the producers and 
the consumers. These companies have extensive 
backward and forward linkages, but their main 
line of business lies in the trading phase.15 
According to one study (Chalmin, 1980), the 
bulk of the international commodity trade is in 
°Though the importance of particular agents varies from 
product to product, it is increasingly difficult to draw a distinction 
on a product basis because of the very diversified activities of the 
trading agents. The distinction between manufacturing, mining 
and trading enterprises is also becoming blurred, due to their 
attempts to diversify into conglomerates with a wide range of 
interests. Manufacturing transnational acquire or establish trad-
ing companies, trading companies expand their range of opera-
tions into manufacturing, banking, and the entire range of other 
services, and retailers acquire interests in manufactures. 
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the hands of about 50 companies, which are 
classified as traders rather than industrials. 
The enormous size of international traders' 
operations and their control over the commodity 
sector are reflected in the fact that in 1980, of the 
roughly US$980 billion global primary commod-
ity exports, around 70 to 80% was controlled by 
multi-commodity traders. This figure includes 
US$230 of US$306 billion worth of crude petro-
leum exports under the control of the world's 
petroleum giants; and around US$500 billion of 
US$674 billion worth of the remainder of prim-
ary commodities, composed of agricultural, min-
eral and metal products and other fuels, under 
the control of multi-commodity traders and the 
trading affiliates of industrial TNCs (Clairmonte 
and Cavanagh, 1982). 
Among international traders, the best-
known are the Japanese multi-product traders, 
known as "sogo-shosha". This term is usually 
used in connection with the top nine trading 
firms in Japan, which controlled in 1985 more 
than 44% of Japanese exports and 12% of Japa-
nese imports. Their combined total sales 
(domestic, exports, imports and offshore trade) 
accounted in the same year for 35 % of the coun-
try's GNP. In 1985, the total combined sales for 
only the top nine companies came to US$440 
billion. Of this figure, US$270 billion corres-
ponded to foreign trade (imports to and exports 
from Japan and offshore transactions). It can be 
estimated, therefore, that the total foreign tran-
sactions of the nine companies —US$ 135 billion 
one way— accounted for approximately 7% of 
global trade in that year (US$1 900 billion). If 
the transactions by their wholly-owned subsi-
diaries and affiliates abroad are added to the 
above figures, it can be concluded that their par-
ticipation in world trade rises to almost 10%. 
According to the Forbes 1985 sales ranking, 
excluding U.S. companies, the Mitsui Bussan 
Co., one of the two largest, came second only to 
Royal Dutch Shell. Seven of the nine sogo-
shosha appear among the ten largest companies 
in the same ranking. Mitsui Bussan, jointly with 
Mitsubishi Shoji, according to a U.S. source, 
transacts roughly 10% of U.S. exports (U.S., 
Dept. of Commerce, 1985 a). 
The size and complexity of commodity trad-
ing agents can also be highlighted by taking the 
example of Cargill, the world's largest grain 
trader, a private company with registered sales 
exceeding US$25 billion in 1980, which has 
established a network of more than 140 subsi-
diaries in over 30 countries (UNCTAD, 1981a). 
In addition to its wide commodity operations, its 
insurance arm offers individual and group 
finance, and its expertises covers bulk commodi-
ties, all facets of agriculture, marketing and spec-
ulation, handling and transportation logistics.16 
2. Some conceptual considerations 
The foregoing observations on the strong foot-
hold maintained by transnational trading com-
panies in the commodity sector do not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that commod-
ity markets are of a purely competitive nature. 
The intermediation provided by such trading 
companies, even though it is categorized as 
arm's-length, can come close to something sig-
nificantly different from the purely competitive 
situation. The price mechanism advocated in 
theory under the free market system is, in many 
cases, not applicable to the commodity trade, 
where a group of oügopsonic buyers confront a 
large number of suppliers, as in many agricultu-
ral commodities, or similarly, where oligopsonic 
buyers confront a small number of oligopolistic 
sellers, as in some of the minerals exported by 
the developing countries. In these asymmetric 
market conditions, prices are determined not 
only by the prevailing market conditions, but 
also by the relative bargaining power of the two 
negotiating parties. 
This type of imbalance in negotiating capac-
ity is applicable to those cases where a powerful 
trading conglomerate represents a group of pro-
ducing or manufacturing companies as their pro-
curement or selling agent, either on the buying 
l6A small number of grain traders, including Cargill, Contin-
ental Grain, Bunge and Born, Louis Dreyfus, Barnac and Cook 
Industries, etc., are responsible for an extremely high percentage of 
world grain trade: from 1970 to 1975 the above six companies 
accounted for as much as 96% of world wheat exports, 95% of 
maize exports, 90% of oats and 80% of the sorghum exports of the 
United States. The same companies also accounted for roughly 
80% of Argentina's wheat exports, 90% of Australia's sorghum 
exports, and 90% of the wheat and maize exported from the EEC 
In Canada, they were responsible for the whole of the share of 
exports allocated to the private sector (20%),as well as fora very 
substantial portion of sales of the remaining 80%, which were 
made through the Canadian Wheat Board (UNCTAD, 1981 b). 
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or selling side. Large trading companies are, in 
general, in a position to influence market prices 
by the volume of their purchases, their capital 
strength and their sophisticated information 
network. What developing countries face in the 
commodity markets is not only the oligopsonic 
market structure of the developed economies but 
also the oligopsonically organized buying 
groups. The weak bargaining power of develop-
ing countries reflects the increasing market 
power of the multi-commodity trading agents as 
well as that of the giant industrials.17 
The usual presumption adopted with regard 
to commodity markets is that their spontaneous 
functioning, in perfectly competitive conditions, 
is basically an efficient and neutral instrument 
for resource allocation rather than a means of 
generating a particular pattern of income distri-
bution. In reality, however, the neoclassical 
approach has only limited applicability to the 
behaviour of commodity markets, some of its 
major deficiencies (among others) being: i) its 
frequent assumption of free entry without any 
uncertainty as well as of the absence of any 
government intervention,18 and its failure to 
deal with the externalities and market imperfec-
tion, which are an integral part of the present 
functioning of these markets; a) its difficulty in 
explaining why markets move from one dis-
equilibrium to another, in a continuous series of 
shortages and surpluses, never establishing an 
automatic equilibrium position; and ÍÜ) its 
limited capacity to produce correct and rational 
"Radetzki points out that price theory, whether under condi-
tions of perfect or monopolistic competition or of oligopoly and 
monopoly among sellers (buyers), has little applicability to the 
commodity markets, as its implicit assumption in most cases is that 
perfect competition prevails on the other side of the market. Price 
theory is of little help in determining the bilateral monopoly/oli-
gopoly price level. The theory of industrial organization also 
suffers from the same deficiency in that it ordinarily only studies 
one side of the market, implicitly assuming perfect market condi-
tions on the other side. With regard to bargaining theory, though it 
provides interesting insights into behavioural patterns in two-
person zero-sum games, it loses its applicability to the commodity 
market in general where there is mutual dependence between 
decision-making entities operating on each side of the market 
(Radetzki, 1980). 
l8Regarding government intervention, it is important to 
mention that in recent years the developed market economy coun-
tries have become much more outspoken in their opposition to 
international commodity agreements, on the ground that they 
would interfere with the free functioning of market forces. How-
ever, many commodities produced and exported by the developed 
countries are already subject to government intervention and 
controls. 
market signals as regards future prices and the 
allocation of resources (Maizels, 1984: Hel-
leiner, Chap. 2, 1981 b). 
A serious imperfection in commodities 
markets is the relative scarcity of market infor-
mation. In a world of perfect competition, all 
participants have equal and complete access to 
all information, and there is no uncertainty 
regarding future price configurations. In reality, 
however, the markets for information itself are 
highly imperfect, if they exist at all, and are 
characterized by bilateral monopoly or oligopoly 
(Helleiner, 1981 b). Uncertainty as to the future 
of prices, when these are as volatile as those of 
primary commodities, makes buying/s el ling, 
storage, shipping and financing operations 
much more complex and introduces a specula-
tive element in the decision-making process. 
Those with the most information are placed in 
the best position to gain from this market 
imperfection. 
It is generally agreed that the search for 
information has the characteristic that it pro-
vides increasing returns. The fixed costs of 
acquiring either a fixed stock or a continuing 
flow of information can be spread over a varying 
volume of transactions. Though the marginal 
cost of supplying information to the first user is 
very high, since it includes all search costs, the 
marginal costs of supplying subsequent users 
include only the cost of communication, and in 
most instances this is small. It is also true that 
since trading activities involve striking a mean 
between low-and high-price centres, the number 
of possible trades between centres will increase 
exponentially for every additional information/ 
trading centre. This means that the larger the 
number of existing contact points, the greater 
will be the potential for striking business deals 
among them. Maintenance of these centres is 
extremely important, since information (espe-
cially on goods and services which are subject to 
continuous disturbance) is highly perishable. 
Thus, in order for the information to have some 
value to the user, he must incur costs not only for 
procuring the information itself, but also for 
maintaining and possibly up-dating and up-
grading it through a trading presence in the 
market. 
Information can always be made available to 
another individual without any elimination of 
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the existing user's access to it. This "public prop-
erty" characteristic creates the problem of the 
appropriability of new information for which 
there is no regular market. 
These peculiarities taken together suggest 
that, as K. Arrow has pointed out, "the demand 
for information is difficult to discuss in the 
rational terms usually employed. The value of 
information is frequently not known in any 
meaningful sense to the buyer; if, indeed he 
knew enough to measure the value of informa-
tion, he would know the information itself" 
(1963, p. 947). The intrinsic value of particular 
information depends on how the user perceives 
its marginal utility, and his evaluation of the 
information is likely to change over time as a 
result of market shifts. Under these circumstan-
ces, co-ordination or internalization within an 
administrative apparatus such as a multinational 
trading company, i.e., information acquisition 
through ¡ts domestic/foreign subsidiaries and 
offices, can avoid the transaction (bargaining 
and enforcing) costs which might have to be 
incurred under arm's length negotiation.19 
From this standpoint, a major problem con-
tributing to the relative weakness of trading 
agents of the Third World is their limited access 
to the information held by the private sector in 
the developed economies. The little information 
that they receive from governmental or other 
sources is inadequate for efficient decision-
making on marketing. Unless the relative 
weakness of the developing countries in their 
information collection/screening/assessment 
capacity is corrected, these countries will be 
likely to continue supplying their products to the 
world market on terms and conditions laid down 
by the consumers, the fairness of which these 
countries are unable to evaluate. 
Many of the world's main primary commod-
ity exports have their prices determined on com-
modity exchanges.20 These exchanges are often 
"The behaviour of a large trading company can be explained 
by its desire to protect ¡tself from or exploit market failure. The 
services that a sogo-shosha, provides, for example, are 
informat ion-intensive, and the characteristics of information, i.e., 
the lack of a market mechanism to determine its value and "public 
property" nature, create externalities. 
20These products include wheat, maize, soybeans, soybean 
meal and oil, palm oil, coffee, cocoa, sugar, rubber, wool, cotton, 
orange juice, copper, tin, lead, zinc, nickel, aluminium, silver, gold 
and, increasingly, petroleum. 
cited as examples of markets where pure compe-
tition is found and where prices are determined 
by the free píay of supply and demand for a given 
commodity. Once again, in the actual world, pri-
ces on exchanges are affected not only by the 
current supply and demand balance but also by 
expectations of supply and demand, by repercus-
sions from the currency markets, and even by 
manipulation. With regard to futures, expecta-
tion as regards the basic economic factors 
becomes more important and the prospects for 
the commodity in question are weighed together 
with the broader economic outlook and the 
expectations of the currency in which the deal is 
denominated. Optimal pricing for each agent 
depends on its own expectations about future 
developments, its conjectures on buying and sel-
ling interests, and all the economic forces which 
affect future prices. Its buying/selling practices 
are also constrained by its financial position and 
utilization of its physical facilities, such as stor-
age and shipping. In short, in a futures transac-
tion, there is little room for the mark-up pricing 
common in many manufacturing activities. Pri-
ces are always in motion, and this problem is 
compounded by the fact that the firm is both 
seller and buyer simultaneously, so that its inter-
est in one capacity might undermine that in its 
other capacity. 
It should also be pointed out that in so far as 
buying/selling contracts are on a futures rather 
than a spot basis, there will be a greater tendency 
for the trading firm to have its subsidiary, affil-
iate or foreign office undertake the actual buying. 
This is because if a contract is on a spot and cash 
on delivery basis, the risk of possible misrepres-
entation of product quality can be dealt with by 
testing on the spot a sample of the product. 
Thus, when contracts are predominantly for 
futures, the cost of arm's-length trading tends to 
rise, and external transactions tend to be 
replaced by vertical/ horizontal integration of 
the trading firm. 
Furthermore, price determination mecha-
nisms at commodity exchanges suffer from sev-
eral serious rigidities: for some commodities 
there are few main producers, as in the case of 
tin, cocoa and coffee; for others, most of the 
demand comes from a few large importers, as in 
the case of wheat. In other cases, a few traders 
may loom large in the market. They are not 
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always in evidence, as they may bid in moderate 
quantities at any one time or through various 
brokers, but if they steadily pursue a specific 
policy they can influence the market and thereby 
affect its transparency. Moreover, other restric-
tions and distortions are created by the 
exchanges themselves: for example, the rules 
governing admission to the various classes of 
membership include financial requirements 
such as bank guarantees and paid-up capital, as 
well as nationality clauses.21 
Imperfections in commodity markets also 
arise due to the large investment capital neces-
sary to establish or expand processing capacities. 
The areas of processing and marketing are intri-
cately interwoven, since often the possibilities 
for processing before export depend on the abil-
ity to secure, beforehand, market outlets for the 
processed product. Prior assurance of market 
possibilities is often necessary in order to raise 
the investment funds needed, especially for min-
erals and metals, where large sums are involved 
and the existence of long-term purchase com-
mitments or other types of arrangements for at 
least a sizeable portion of the output is regarded 
as a partial guarantee for the potential investor. 
A high frequency of long-term contracts in the 
commodity sector, in this sense, signifies that 
the market is no longer competitive and free 
through the continuous auctioning process 
between buyers and sellers. The nature of the 
long-term contract, in turn, reflects the relative 
strength of both parties. 
The type of price determination postulated 
by the neoclassical approach does not apply to 
the transport sector either. It is found that in the 
case of many commodities freight rates are as 
much as 20% of the CIF prices and that fluctua-
tions and changes in freight rates have a signifi-
cant impact on price, on the market demand for 
these products and on the net earnings of pro-
ducers. However, the observed structure of 
freight rates, in general, does not seem to reflect 
the true cost of carriage, and the rates are instead 
determined in an arbitrary manner. The general 
practice in the industry is to charge "what the 
traffic will bear" and the most often used mea-
2lFor a summary discussion on the problems relating to the 
operation of commodity exchanges in the context of higher í*artíc¡-
pation in them by developing countries, see UNCTAD (1983 a). 
sure is the unit value per ton of the commodity, 
which has little relation to the marginal cost-
based system of charges.22 As a result, with high-
value commodities subsidizing low-value ones, 
excess freight factors escalate in a similar 
manner to tariffs. The arbitrariness in the set-
ting of freight rates is related, in many cases, to 
the different bargaining positions of the expor-
ters and shipping companies. 
In sum, contrary to the postulates of conven-
tional theories and the solutions that they imply, 
commodity markets operate in far-from-
equilibrium states where spontaneous self-
correcting impulses fail to assert themselves. 
3. Characteristics of transnational 
trading companies 
The rationale for the existence of transnational 
multi-product trading companies and the reason 
for their expansion are to be found in the very 
roles and functions which they play:2î for exam-
ple, the minimization or reduction of the risks 
inherent in both domestic and international 
trade which arise from fluctuations in commod-
ity demand and supply as well as in exchange 
rates. Since it is difficult and costly to insure 
against these factors, the trading companies 
reduce risks by distributing them over many 
transactions. The larger the number of commod-
ities handled, and the more diversified sales are 
by geographical region and types of buyers, the 
more widely the risks involved can be distrib-
uted. The feature of multi-commodity trading is 
thus explained by their desire to take advantage 
of the risk-reducing effect arising from scale and 
diversification. A wide portfolio, not restricted 
only to commodities but compensated by large 
product lines in manufactures and services and 
also by extensive geographical markets, reduces 
income fluctuations by compensating for large 
variations in individual product income. 
The risk involved in the fluctuation of 
exchange rates is reduced when the net transfer 
of cash through clearing arrangements, as in the 
settlement of intra-regional or interbank 
accounts, is only a fraction of total transactions. 
"These points are raised in Yeats (1981). 
2JFor a summary of these issues, see Yamamura (1976), 
Young (1978), and Roehl (1983). 
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It should also be borne in mind that a trading 
company engaged in both importing and export-
ing is able to buy and sell in local currencies, 
thereby reducing transactions across currencies 
to a small fraction of the total import and export 
business. 
These companies' attribute of wide product 
and geographical market diversification 
increases the possibility of creating third-
country trade or counter-trade. Unlike a single-
commodity trader, the multi-commodity trading 
company can act, for example, as an importer of 
manufactured goods in exchange for exports of 
primary commodities or vice versa. When a 
company caters for a large clientele on both the 
exporting and importing sides, this can allow it 
to find a market for a product for which the 
producer has no direct marketing and distribu-
tion relationships. Similarly, in the present con-
ditions of shortage of credit, there has been a 
substantial increase in the need for arrange-
ments whereby buyers oblige sellers to provide 
export/markets equivalent to the hard-currency 
value of the goods imported.24 
Another feature of transnational traders is 
the size of their financial operations and thereby 
the derived credit-worthiness, which in turn 
rests on their ability to reduce the risks involved 
in transactions and to take advantage of econo-
mies of scale in using the capital made available 
to them. In this manner, the trading companies 
can often function as providers or guarantors of 
credit, or can engage in trading with a variety of 
credit instruments rather than cash settlements. 
In the case of the nine largest sogo-shosha, credit 
extended by them in 1982 to their clients reached 
US$58.1 billion, while they themselves received 
over US$44.1 billion of loans from various bank-
ing institutions (Sogo-shosha Nenkan, 1984). 
Another important function is their ability 
to reduce "transaction costs". As mentioned ear-
lier, this term refers to the costs involved in 
gathering/processing/screening information 
about market opportunities and economic 
intelligence, contract negotiations and enforce-
"According to the National Foreign Trade Council of the 
United States, the number of countries requiring some form of 
counter-trade has increased from 28 in 1979 to 88 in 1984 The 
same organization reports that 8% of U.S. exports are currently 
subject to counter-trade -47 % in the case of the aerospace industry. 
ment, and obtaining transportation services. 
Regarding information, for instance, the "pro-
duction" of information about market oppor-
tunities —prices and locations of sellers and 
buyers, their credit-worthiness, etc.— includes 
the costs of gathering and disseminating the 
information. It should be noted, however, that 
these costs are fixed, independent of the use to 
which the information in question is put. This 
points to the existence of economies of scale in 
information-gathering activities and also to the 
decline in search costs per unit of information in 
accordance with the expansion of the market 
size. 
In the area of transportation, although trad-
ing companies, may not necessarily provide their 
own transportation, they can reduce the cost per 
unit of goods transported by co-ordinating ship-
ping times and locations and cargo space. Trans-
portation costs are also reduced through the 
facilities provided and arrangements made at 
ports of origin and destination. Such facilities 
and arrangements are known to have large fixed 
costs but only small marginal costs. After the 
investment in fixed costs, exporters would 
obtain flexibility in organizing and timing ship-
ments, thus improving their stock-keeping and 
marketing operations. 
Since it is known that the Japanese and the 
Europeans rely heavily on this type of traders 
and that the United States is moving gradually 
towards the expansion of its trading sector by 
adopting more dynamic and diversified trading 
mechanisms along these lines,25 either creating 
similar organizations or strengthening the exist-
ing trading entities in the Latin American and 
the Caribbean region might be a way to prevent 
further intensification of the control of com-
modity markets by TNCs. In the context of devel-
oping economies, this type of trading 
organization can be an effective means of com-
bating the inadequacies of the commodity 
markets, particularly in the following aspects: 
i) strengthening of trade leverage against TNCs; 
ii) strengthening of more independent commer-
"The passing of the Export Trading Company Act by the 
U.S. Congress on 8 October 1982 has signified a new trend towards 
introducing a Japanese-style trading company culture and espe-
cially towards taking advantage of the potential that the newly 
created companies offer for counter-trade. 
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cial information systems; iii) pooling of import 
requirements and export sales, which should 
strengthen the negotiating position; iv) taking 
advantage of economies of scale, particularly in 
such areas as shipping, bulk handling and stor-
1. Producers' associations 
The Third World countries' inability to control 
various stages of the marketing chain and their 
subordinate position resulting therefrom are 
linked with the power of the TNCs, which have 
firm control over finance, production, markets, 
transport, technology, information, etc. The 
development of an effective countervailing force 
against such a concentration of power will, to a 
large extent, depend on the actions which the 
developing countries can take at their govern-
ment level. Admittedly, however, the resources 
required and the degree of co-ordinated action 
necessary to countervail these centres of eco-
nomic power would be difficult to find in a small, 
competing, national private enterprise unit. In 
recognition of this fact, it has been realized that 
only through co-ordinated joint actions can the 
Third World as a whole, or the region, achieve 
greater participation and gradually changes, for 
their own benefit, in the rules governing the 
operations of these markets. 
Realization of the above has led, in the past 
twodecades, to the creation of numerous produc-
ers' exporters' associations, either at the regional 
or international level. In agricultural commodi-
ties alone, during the last two decades one can 
identify more than 15 producers' exporters' 
associations of international significance (FAO, 
1984). Nevertheless, as shown below, an exami-
nation of the performance of international and 
regional producers' associations reveals that in 
general they have failed in their major undertak-
ing, either for lack of appropriate support from 
the countries which created them, or because 
age; v) co-ordination of actions aimed at over-
coming restrictive and protective measures 
taken by the industrialized countries; and 
vi) amplification of compensatory trade at the 
regional and subregional level. 
some important producers refrained from 
becoming members. Furthermore divergent pol-
icies and sometimes conflicting strategies 
pursued by individual producing countries have 
had detrimental effeots on the international 
commodity markets. 
In the case of CIPEC (Consejo Interguberna-
mental de Países Exportadores de Cobre), collec-
tive efforts have stopped short of original 
expectations. The eight member countries, 
which together account for approximately 40% 
of world production, have tended to seek short-
term economic benefits rather than to foster the 
achievement of more stable real income in 
longer-term perspective. In the mid-1970s, for 
instance, when talks on a possible copper agree-
ment were taking place as part of the Conference 
on International Economic Co-operation and 
within the Intergovernmental Group of Experts 
convened by UNCTAD, the Government of Chile 
decided unilaterally not to adhere to a 15% pro-
duction reduction previously agreed upon by the 
Special Conference of Ministers of CIPEC. 
Instead, the Chilean Government implemented 
a programme of production expansion 
(Martner, 1979, pp. 89-95). This action on the 
part of Chile not only reduced the price of copper 
internationally but also "acted as an internal 
brake on CIPEC activity, reducing the organiza-
tion to the level of a passive spectator of events 
on the world markets and impeding UNCTAD 
talks aimed at establishing a system of price 
stabilization" (Martner, 1979, p. 95). 
In view of its ambitious investment plans to 
expand production, taking advantage of its very 
low production costs, the Chilean strategy seems 
IV 
Experiences of commodity marketing institutions 
in a Latin American context 
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to be to expand its capacity, in spite of the world 
glut. One of the main objectives of CIPEC, i.e., to 
promote the harmonization of decisions and 
policies of member countries relating to copper 
production and marketing, has consequently met 
with little success. 
In the case of tin, the decision by Brazil 
—which has rapidly increasing production and 
an even higher potential for the future (in 1985 
it became the second largest producer of this 
metal after Malaysia)— not to join the recently 
established Association of Tin Producing Coun-
tries (ATPC) has undermined that organiza-
tion's aim to stabilize the market. Brazil, which 
is not a member of the International Tin Council 
(ITC) either, has been increasing its share of the 
world market at an astonishing pace, at the 
expense of others who have been trying to insti-
tute some orderly marketing mechanisms. Non-
ATPC members increased their output when the 
ATPC countries reduced their tin supply to the 
world market from 194 000 tons in 1981 to 
125 000 tons in 1983. These "cut-throat" moves 
not only stifle the initiatives of the members of 
commodity associations but also give the deve-
loped consumer countries the impression that 
there is no co-ordination among developing pro-
ducing countries.26 
Though the International Tin Council is not 
a producers' association, the crisis facing it 
implies a failure of the collective efforts to seek a 
reduction in production. For a long period, the 
Council tried to absorb, the excessive world 
supply, especially through artificially high sup-
port prices, and the apparent supply-demand 
equilibrium was only achieved through the 
Council's constantly growing reserves. A detri-
mental factor leading to this result was undoubt-
edly the rapid increase in the production coming 
from some non-ITC members such as Brazil and 
China. 
Another mineral producers' association of 
international character is the International 
Bauxite Association (IBA), which was created in 
1974 and whose members are Australia, Domin-
"Recently Brazil has decided to co-operate with the ATPC 
and restrict tin exports to 21 000 tons from March 1987 to Febru-
ary 1988. This should be a crucial element in helping to achieve the 
ATPC's export target of no more than 105 000 tons in a bid to buoy 
up world prices and reduce international stocks. 
¡can Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Sierra Leone, Suriname and 
Yugoslavia. The principal objectives of the 
Association are: i) to promote the orderly and 
rational development of the bauxite/alumina/ 
aluminium industry in its member countries; 
ii) to secure for its members fair and reasonable 
returns from the mining, processing and mar-
keting of bauxite and its products; and iii) to 
safeguard the interests of member countries in 
relation to the industry, which faces a high domi-
nation of TNCs.27 
In spite of their potential bargaining power, 
the IBA's major policy instrument is the applica-
tion of minimum prices for basic-grade bauxite: 
a system which gives the members a fair amount 
of latitude, with no binding commitment except 
that of selling their bauxite above the minimum 
recommended price. However, these recom-
mended prices have not always been observed 
either by the TNCs or by the bauxite-producing 
countries. According to a specialized publication, 
"transnational have regarded the IBA as a paper 
tiger, because of its inability to agree on funda-
mental issues such as pricing policy" (Latin 
American Commodities Report, 1982). 
More exclusively at the regional level, there 
are several cases of producers' associations 
whose functioning is severely undermined by the 
lack of solidarity, co-ordination and political will 
to safeguard the long-term interests of the 
respective industry. 
The Unión de Países Exportadores de 
Banano (UPEB) is a good case in point. The 
potential bargaining power of this group, which 
was created in 1974 and consists of eight 
members (Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, and Venezuela), accounting for 17% of 
world production and 50% of world exports, has 
been stifled by Ecuador's decision, from the 
outset, to remain outside this regional arrange-
ment. Ecuador is responsible for 15-20% of the 
world exports of this fruit. 
"The potential importance of the IBA is reflected by the 
aggregated position of its 11 members in terms of total possible 
world bauxite reserves (72%); world bauxite and alumina produc-
tion (75% and 45%, respectively); and world bauxite exports 
(90%). 
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Strictly on the issue of marketing, the Sev-
enth Meeting of Ministers of the UPEB, held in 
1976, decided to establish a commercial arm of 
UPEB in the form of a multinational corporation 
responsible for the marketing and transport of 
members' fruit and other related products, in 
order to counteract the control of TNCs in these 
areas.28 The objective was materialized in 1977, 
when representatives from Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Honduras and Panama created the Com-
pañía Comercializadora Multinacional del 
Banano (COMUNBANA, S.A.). This enterprise 
was and still is perceived as the executive instru-
ment of UPEB marketing policies, and it is open 
to all members of UPEB. 
It should be stressed that COMUNBANA 
faced an impossible task in seeking to fulfil its 
objectives when UPEB members refused to com-
mit their shipments to it. At the peak of its 
operation, it was only able to handle one ship-
ment of bananas a month (mainly due to shor-
tage of fruit), whereas it was thought that buyers 
in the traditional import markets required 
weekly arrivals of bananas. From the initial 1978 
contract with Yugoslavia up to the end of 1981, it 
marketed a quantity equivalent to 0.5% at the 
most of total annual world trade in bananas. The 
dismal performance of COMUNBANA was 
clearly due to the uncommitted stance of its 
member countries, and while it still exists on 
paper it has stopped its operations. 
Lack of support from the countries which 
created a regional co-operation organization is 
also to be observed in the case of the Empresa 
Multinacional Latinoamericana de Comerciali-
zación de Fertilizantes, S.A. (MULTIFERT). The 
Panama-based company was formed in 1980 as a 
commercial venture, under the auspices of the 
Latin American Economic System (SELA), with 
the main objective of marketing fertilizers in 
order to ensure supplies of these products to and 
from the region and to facilitate their sale in 
i8The most prominent TNCs in the industry are United 
Brands, Castle and Cooke (a subsidiary of Standard Fruit) and Del 
Monte (RJ. Reynolds). These three firms control almost 100% of 
the banana exports from Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Panama, and a significant percentage of those of Colombia (60%) 
and of Ecuador (40%). On the otherhand.it is estimated that 35% 
of the fruit produced in Central America, Colombia and Ecuador is 
marketed by national entities of the producer countries. 
third markets, through the bigger bargaining 
power secured by the consolidation of supply and 
demand. 
Though the performance of this organiza-
tion has not been insignificant —it had total 
transactions of US$ 129 million for the period up 
to February 1984—, it has been far below the 
original expectations of the establishing nations. 
The transaction figures envisaged for 1980,1982 
and 1985, for instance, were US$155 million, 
US$400 million and US$545 million respec-
tively, which would have meant that MULTI-
FERT would market in those years 30%, 60% 
and 70% of the total purchases of the 11 
members of the SELA Action Committee 
(ECLAC, 1984 a). The explanation for this 
marked difference between the forecasts and 
reality must be sought not only in the over-
ambitious aspirations but also the lack of politi-
cal commitment of the member countries which 
created it. Among the 11 members of the Com-
mittee, only eight subscribed to the agreement 
establishing MULTIFERT. Furthermore, the low 
import demand was related to the inconsistency 
of those stockholders (mainly State companies) 
which decided not to channel their operations 
through MULTIFERT. The situation became still 
more complex when the Government of Peru, a 
member country which had been the promotor 
of this organization, liberalized the importation 
of fertilizers and the Empresa Nacional de 
Comercialización de Insumos (ENCI) of that 
country lost its major attributes as the State 
monopoly. Venezuela also eliminated the State 
monopoly of VENFERCA. Thus, as may be seen, 
added to the inefficiency of MULTIFERT itself 
was a functional instability which worked 
against the sustained performance of this multi-
national organization. 
With regard to regional co-operation in the 
marketing of primary commodities, the expe-
rience of the Bogotá Group (later Pancafe S.A.)29 
is illustrative in that it demonstrated the magni-
tude of the influence that can be exerted by 
wThe objective of this group, which consisted of Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico 
and Venezuela, was to establish, manage and operate a coffee 
trading company, and to that end to purchase, sell, handle and 
market coffee. 
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producers in the international market place 
when some concerted actions are decided upon 
and enforced. Despite its short life, the overall 
high price level of coffee registered in 
1978/1979 and 1979/1980 was mostly attributa-
ble to the market intervention undertaken by 
this group. Conservative estimates indicate that 
the group was able to keep the price at least 10% 
above the usual level during these periods. Due 
to the insistence of the United States and other 
members of the International Coffee Agreement 
(ICA) that this group must be liquidated as a 
pre-condition of their willingness to restart 
negotiations for a new agreement, however, the 
leaders of the Latin American countries decided 
to opt for the utilization of the economic clauses 
within the ICA as a price defence mechanism 
instead of the joint actions of the group. Never-
theless, the regional efforts made in this field 
generated a much better bargaining position for 
the producing countries in the negotiations 
towards the new agreement and led to a softened 
position by the United States, in particular, over 
the price ranges negotiated. 
An examination of the past performance of 
several international and regional associations 
working in commodities indicates that they have 
stopped far short of their original aspirations. 
Even though they have made valuable contribu-
tions, especially in the area of information col-
lection and dissemination, there has been little 
success in meeting the pressing need to control 
supply and co-ordinate marketing decisions. 
These associations have not succeeded in achiev-
ing price stabilization or some scheme of orderly 
marketing on the basis of reduction of supply by 
producers. The vested interests within the asso-
ciations, the weak financial capacity of producers 
to collectively support the withholding of supp-
lies, inability to withstand the effects of supply 
cutbacks on their national economies (e.g., on 
employment and foreign exchange earnings), 
and the fact that some countries have not joined 
the groups (e.g., Ecuador was not a member of 
UPEB) have greatly undermined the bargaining 
position of these organizations in international 
negotiation fora. Much of the blame for the 
unsatisfactory performance of the producers' 
associations is attributable to the lack of a real 
perception of common interests and collective 
trust among the producing countries. 
2. State Trading Organizations (STOs) 
Most countries engage in some form of State 
trading, and the Latin American countries are no 
exception. On a world-wide scale, estimates 
based on GATT documents and other sources 
indicate that, in the 1970s, the proportion of 
State trading in exports was 20-25% in New 
Zealand, 10-15% in Australia, 8-14% in the 
U.S., and 9-11% in Canada, while the proportion 
represented by State trading in imports was 18-
20% in the U.K., 18-24% in France and 8-10% 
injapan (Kostecki, 1978). With respect to Latin 
America, it is estimated that close to 40% of 
total regional imports are accounted for by 
government purchases, and the percentage is 
substantially higher in the areas of energy and 
foodstuffs (Ondarto and Correa, 1982; ALADI, 
1985). Referring to the region again, an 
UNCTAD study has shown that in the 1970s, in 
seven (Argentina, Brazil.Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela) of the eight countries 
surveyed, 10% or more of imports and/or 
exports were in the hands of State-owned pro-
ducing or marketing firms (UNCTAD, 1978 b). 
The general observation may be made, as 
confirmed in an ECLAC document (ECLAC, 1986 
c), that the nature and structure of the STOs in 
the region is limited. Among the most impor-
tant of the large-scale trading entities which are 
State-owned enterprises are the producers and 
distributors of petroleum and its products. These 
include Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF, 
Argentina), Petrobras (Brazil), Petroperú 
(Peru), Petroven (Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.) 
and ANCAP (Administración Nacional de Com-
bustibles, Alcohol y Portland, Uruguay). The 
predominance of these enterprises reflects the 
relative importance of petroleum in the total 
import/export trade of the region. In non-fuel 
commodities, however, the STOs' inroads into 
world markets are not significant in terms of 
volume or of the variety of products handled. 
The participation of COBEC (Companhia Brasi-
leira de Entrepostos e Comercio), once often 
cited as one of the most influential STOs in the 
region, has been reduced to an almost insignifi-
cant level: in 1984, it was responsible for exports 
equivalent to 0.07% of the national total, 
whereas Interbras, a trading subsidiary of the 
State oil company Petrobras of Brazil (another 
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influential STO in the region) was responsible 
for roughly 3 % of Brazil's total exports in the 
same year, not to mention its commodity exports 
(CACEX, Banco do Brasil, 1985).30 
Some Latin American STOs are said to have 
achieved a high level of direct trade. However, it 
should be recognized that though a major objec-
tive is to dispense with the services of traders 
and brokers as intermediaries and to increase 
direct exports/imports with consumers/suppli-
ers abroad, in many cases STOs' participation in 
their nation's foreign trade still involves that of 
other economic agents, mostly foreign. For 
example, in the case of imports of foodstuffs 
ENCI of Peru merely invites periodic offers in 
the forms of tenders from foreign traders, who 
actually carry out the import transaction. This is 
far from what can be called direct trade. Rather, 
the participation of the State trading entity just 
adds another intermediation stage. 
One objective common to all STOs is the 
strengthening of market power, especially at the 
international level. Regarding exports, some of 
the major responsibilities assigned to STOs par-
ticularly those of the Third World, involve the 
purchasing and marketing of products which are 
major sources of foreign exchange earnings, 
diversification of export markets and product 
promotion for small- and medium-size enter-
prises. The disadvantages arising when several 
thousand producers of a given commodity com-
pete among themselves on international 
markets may be reduced through some form of 
co-ordinated marketing or centralized produc-
tion control for exports. With respect to 
imports, the aim is frequently to obtain more 
favourable prices and terms by centralizing pur-
chases or to secure stable supplies of essential 
imports. These objectives relating to the exter-
nal sector are correlated with domestic ones, 
among which the most important are promotion 
of domestic prices and distribution policy, inte-
gration of foreign trade into central planning, 
,0COB£C was established to compete with powerful trading 
firms involved in the marketing of soybeans, and it dealt in a 
number of agricultural commodities, including coffee. However, in 
1981 COBEC exported only US$32 million worth of coffee, against 
the national total exports of coffee of US$1.5 billion. Interbras' 
impact was also negligible, accounting for only 2% of totalexports 
of coffee beans. The figures are calculated from UNCTAD( 1983 b). 
raising government revenue, and health and 
strategic control considerations. 
Rationales for STOs also include other argu-
ments, such as that the government may be able 
to improve the country's bargaining power by 
utilizing its negotiating power arising from 
exports of other products or its capacity to 
import.31 Also export policies effected at the 
government level are more likely to have a possi-
bility of modifying the commercial policies of 
other governments. A State-run monopoly may 
be in a better position to effect deals with other 
STOs in bilateral/multilateral negotiations.32 
Furthermore, some form of government co-
operation in trading is necessary in cases where 
private returns from entering new markets or 
initiating trade in new products are lower than 
the actual social return. If this is the case, govern-
ments may be more willing to consider the ele-
ment of externality. This would apply to the case 
where there is a desire to break away from tradi-
tional trade links. Large orders aggregated at the 
national level under a State monopoly also lower 
the cost of procurement, transport and use of 
warehouse space and facilitate the systematiza-
tion of import procedures.33 
STOs of the developing regions can be consi-
dered an effective means of increasing intra-
regional commodity trade, which at present 
stands at a very low level. In value terms, Latin 
Americas intra-regional exports of commodi-
ties account for only 15% of its total commodity 
exports, while more than 6 5 % goes to the deve-
loped market economies. In imports, intra-
regional trade in commodities reaches only 30% 
(ECLAC 1986 b). In view of this imbalance, the 
Latin American countries have a high potential 
MA good case can be made hereby Brazil, which has become 
one of the world's leading counter-traders. The government-
owned In ter bras has been successful in offsetting at least half of its 
oil purchases, which account for roughly 505f of the country's 
import bill, by supplying food and manufactured products to oil 
producers on a counter-trade basis (Carey and McLean, 1986, 
p. 459). 
>JThe increasing recognition of the importance of counter-
trade on the part of developing country governments, for example, 
led ASTRO (Association of State Organizations of Developing 
Countries) to establish a reference service on counter-trade practi-
ces, and it plans to initiate programmes for teaching STO represen-
tatives negotiating tactics and contract practices in a counter-trade 
context. 
>3For more detailed treatment of these points, see Kóstecki 
(1978) and Sauliners (1981). 
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—without adversely affecting the present level 
of extra-regional exports— for increasing their 
commodity trade among themselves. Taking 
into account the enormous government purchas-
ing power —it may be repeated that close to 
40% of total Latin American imports are 
government purchases one way or another— the 
expansion of intra-regional trade through exist-
In general, the Latin American region 
—whether alone, or jointly with other regions of 
the Third World— has not been able to develop 
the alternative mechanisms or effectively pursue 
the objectives that it has been seeking in interna-
tional negotiations with consumer countries. For 
example, the countries of the region have not 
been successful ¡n implementing supply regula-
tion schemes which could have had a significant 
impact on the level of prices. Similarly, as dem-
onstrated above, the operation of a producers' 
association will be successful only when the 
appropriate institutional set-up and a real per-
ception of common interests and collective trust 
among the producing countries exist and are 
effectively exploited. From this perspective, the 
countries of the region should seek to achieve 
maximum credibility as a negotiating entity by 
instituting regional co-operative actions as the 
starting point for developing their negotiating 
postures. Furthermore, if there were a real per-
ception of common interests, there would not 
always be a need for supervision by the consum-
ing countries in order to guarantee the fulfil-
ment of export quotas or similar measures to 
support prices. 
In view of the fact that a high proportion of 
world output and exports of many commodities 
is accounted for by Latin America, the existing 
regional producers' associations should engage 
more actively in marketing, either by taking 
their own initiatives in these areas or by becom-
ing more effective co-ordinators of marketing 
policies among their member countries. This 
does not preclude the possibility of their becom-
ing multinational trading companies. 
Even though their impact on the national 
economy has been less than originally conceived, 
ing or newly created STOs provides wide scope 
and opportunity for regional co-operation. 
Equally, the strengthening of marketing entities 
such as STOs could greatly increase trade flows 
towards other developing regions where the 
principal growth in world demand for many of 
the commodities produced in the region is 
foreseen. 
considering that the relative bargaining position 
of the buyer vs. seller plays a critical role in price 
determination, State trading organizations can 
nevertheless be an appropriate instrument for 
the realization and exercise of market power, 
especially for the developing countries, in order 
to countervail the dominance of the marketing 
systems by developed country agents. Through 
this instrument, the importation of certain pro-
ducts can be tied, as a package, to exports of 
commodities, so as to secure stable and more 
remunerative prices for the latter. In the present 
economic environment in which the Latin 
American countries are immersed, there is a 
high probability that concentrated selling/pur-
chasing at the government level will equip policy 
makers better to counter the increasing protec-
tionist measures applied to them. State trading 
organizations are also considered an effective 
tool for increasing intra-regional trade in com-
modities and for enlarging and facilitating var-
ious counter-trade schemes with countries inside 
and outside the region. 
There is increasing recognition on the part 
of Latin American governments that seeking 
solutions to many of the problems in the com-
modity sector in the exclusive framework of 
North-South co-operation does not lead to sub-
stantial results, and that the time has come to 
approach negotiations with consumer countries 
within a much broader framework, integrating 
commodities in the overall trade negotiations 
instead of leaving them isolated as they have 
been up to now. One of the pillars of this larger 
framework is that Latin America should inte-
grate its regional purchasing power of goods and 
services into overall commodity negotiations. To 
exercise this power, it is imperative that the 
Conclusions 
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countries in the region should establish mecha-
nisms and instruments which link the capacity to 
import various products of the industrialized 
countries (e.g., manufactures, technology, capital 
goods, services, investments, etc.) to the need to 
ALAD] (Latin American Integration Association) (1985): Canali-
zación regional de la demanda import oda por el sector público 
(A LA DI/SEC/Estudio 29). 
Arrow K. (1983): Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medi-
cal care. The American Economic Review, vol. 53, No. 5. 
CACEX (Cartera de Comercio Exterior) Banco do Brasil (1985): 
Comercio Exterior 1984: Series Estadísticas. Riodejaneíro. 
Carey, Sarah C. and Sheila Avrin McLean (1986): The United 
States countertrade and Third World trade. Journal of World 
Trade Law, vol. 20, No. 4. July-August, pp. 441-473-
CASAR (Action Committee on Food Security-SE LA) (1984): Segu-
ridad alimentaria, information bulletin of the SELA Action 
Committee on Regional Food Security. September-
December. 
Chalmin, Ph. ( 1980): Internationalcommodity trading companies. 
Journal of World Trade Law. November-December. 
Clairmonte, F.F. and J. Cavanagh (1982): Transnational corpora-
tions and global markets: changing power relations. Trade 
and Development, No. 4, Winter. Geneva: UNCTAD. United 
Nations Publication, Sales No.: E.83.II.D.L 
Coase, R.H. (1937): The nature of the firm Económica, vol. 4, 
pp. 386-405. 
Dunning, J.H. and R.D.Pearce( 1981): The World's Largest Enter 
prises. Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing Ltd. 
ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carib-
bean) (1982): The Mexican Cotton industry and the Transna-
tional Cotton Marketing Oligopoly (E/CEPAL/R.315). San-
tiago, Chile. 
( 1982b): Bargaining Position and Distribution of Gains in 
the Banana Exporting Countries, especially Honduras and 
Panama (E/CEPAL/R.321). Santiago, Chile. 
(1982c): The Transnational Oligopoly in the Coffee Indus-
try and the Case of Colombia (E/CEPAL/R.323). Santiago, 
Chile. 
( l982d): Links of the Transnational Corporations with the 
Tin Industry in Bolivia (E/CEPAL/R.249). Santiago, Chile. 
(1982e): The Development of the Copper Industry and 
Transnational Corporations: The Chilean Experience 
(E/CEPAL/R.239). Santiago, Chile. 
(1982f): Policies and Negotiations with Transnational Cor-
porations in the Copper Industry in Peru (E/CEPAL/R.270). 
Santiago, Chile. 
( 1983a): Aspects of a Latin American Policy in the Com-
modities Sector (E/CEPAL/R.335/Rev.l). Santiago, Chile. 
(1983b): Empresas transnacionales en la industria de ali-
mentos: el caso argentino: cereales y carne. Estudios e 
Informes de la CEPAL, Series Na 29 (E/CEPAL/G.1255). 
Santiago, Chile. United Nations publication, Sales No.: 
S.83.II.G.25. 
(1984a): América Latina: Panorama actual de la integración 
y cooperación (E/CEPAL/L.299). Santiago, Chile. 
( 1984b): Dirección y estructura del comercio latinoameri-
cano: Exportaciones, importaciones, saldos comerciales, 
19701982 (LC/G.1329). Santiago, Chile. 
raise commodity export earnings. In this scena-
rio, the strengthening of the existing trading 
entities (national or regional) and/or the crea-
tion of new ones of a more multi-product nature 
is seen as an urgent necessity. 
(1986a): Procesamiento local de los productos básicos lati-
noamericanos (LC/R.505). Santiago, Chile. 
(1986b): Reorientación del comercio de productos básicos 
hacia América Latina (LC/R.506). Santiago, Chile. 
( 1986c): Comercialización y estructura de los mercados de 
productos básicos de América Latina y el Caribe (LC/R.508). 
Santiago, Chile. 
Edwards, Anthony (1975): The Potential for New Cartels. The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, QER, Special No. 37. 
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) 
(1984): Commodity Review and Outlook: ¡982-1983. Rome. 
< 1986): The World Banana Economy 1970-1984: Structure, 
Performance and Prospects. FAO Economic and Social Devel-
opment Paper, No. 57. Rome. 
Helleiner, GK. (1979): Transnational corporations and trade 
structure: The rote of intra-firm trade. Herbert Giersch (éd.). 
Intra-Industry Trade. Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck. 
( 1981a): Intra-Eirm Trade and the Developing Countries. 
New York: St. Martin's Press. 
— (1981b): International Economic Disorder: Essays in 
North-South Relations. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press. 
Hveem, Helge (1977): The Political Economy of Third World 
Producer Associations. Oslo. 
Japan, Ministry of International Trade and Industry (1983): 
Wagakuni kigyo no kaigai jigyo katsudo (Activities of Japa-
nese Companies Abroad). Surveys Nos. 10-11. 
Kostecki, M.M. (1978): State trading in industrialized and develop-
ing countries. Journal of World Trade Law. May-June. 
Lahera, Eugenio ( 1983): Las empresas transnacionales en la pro-
ducción, industrialización y comercialización de ¡a soya en 
America Latina (E/CEPAL/R.340). Santiago, Chile: ECLAC 
Latin American Commodities Report ( 1982): (CR-82-09). 7 May. 
Maizels, Alfred (1984): A conceptual framework for analysis of 
primary commodities markets. World Development, vol. 12, 
No. 1, pp. 25-41. 
Martner, Gonzalo (1979): Producers'-Exporters' Associations of 
Developing Countries. Geneva. 
Metal Bulletin (1986): London. 4 April, p. 1. 
McManus, J. (1972): The theory of the international firm. G. 
Paquet (éd.). The Multinational Firm and the Nation State. 
Toronto: Coilier-Macmillan. 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun (1986): 14 June. 
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment) (1975): industrial Raw Materials. Paris: The General 
Secretariat. 
Ondarto, G. and CM. Correa (1982): Compras estatales e inte-
gración económica. Buenos Aires: B1D-INTAL 
Prebisch, Raúl (1950): The Economie Development of Latin 
America and Us Principal Problems (E/CN. 12/89/Rev. 1). 
New York. United Nations publication. Sales No.: 50.II.G.2. 
(1964): Towards a New Trade Policy for Development: 
Report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Con-
Bibliography 
108 CEPAL REVIEW No. 34 / April I9HH 
ference on Trade and Development (E/CONF.46/3). New 
York. United Nations publication, Sales No.: 64.II.B.4. 
Radetzki, Marian (1976): The potential for monopolistic commod-
ity pricing by developing countries. G. Helleiner (éd.). A 
World Divided. London: Cambridge University Press. 
(1980): Market structure and bargaining power. S. Sideri 
and S. Johns (eds.). Mining for Development in the Third 
World. New York: Pergamon Press, pp. 123-142. 
Rapp, W.P. (1976): Firm size and japan's export structure: a 
microview of Japan's changing export competitiveness since 
Meiji. H. Patrick (ed), Japanese Industrialization and its 
Social Consequences. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Rodrik, Dani (1982): Managing resource dependency: the United 
States and Japan in the markets for copper, iron ore and 
bauxite. World Development, vol. 1ft No. 7, pp. 541-560. 
Roehl, Thomas (1983): A transaction cost approach to interna-
tional trading structures: the case of the Japanese general 
trading companies. Hit ot subas hi Journal of Economics, 
vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 119-135. 
Sánchez Albavera, F. (1983): Profile and Possibility of a Multina-
tional Ore Marketing Enterprise: The Case of Latin America. 
Study prepared at the request of the UNCTAD secretariat. 
Santos, Manuel R. (1982): Possibilities for Trade Expansion and 
Other Forms of Co-operation among State Trading Organi-
zations in the Field of Sugar (TD/B/C.7/54). Study prepared 
at the requst of the UNCTAD secretariat. 
Saulitiers, A. (1981): State trading organizations: a bias decision 
model and applications. World Development, vol, 9, No, 7. 
Sogo-shosha Nenkan (Yearbook of Sogo-Shosha) (1984): Tokyo: 
Nihon Kogo Shinbunsha. 
Special UN Service (1985): International Foundation for Develop-
ment Alternatives. 13 June. 
UBEC (Union of Banana Exporting Countries): Informe mensual 
(Various issues.) 
UNCTC (United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations) 
( 1981a): Transnational Corporations in the Copper Industry 
(ST/CTC/21). New York. 
(1981b): Transnational Corporations: Food and Beverage 
Processing. New York. United Nations publication, Sales 
No.: E.81.II.A.3, 
(1983): Transnational Corporations in World Develop-
ment: Third Survey. United Nations publication, Sales No.: 
E.83.II.A.14 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment) (1978a): Marketing and Distribution of Tobacco 
(TD/B/C.1/205). Geneva. 
(1978b): Co-operation between State Trading Organiza-
tions in Latin America. Geneva. 
(1980a): A Preliminary Analysis of some Aspects of 
Marketing and Distribution of Cotton (TD/B/IPC/Cotton 
19). Geneva. 
(1980b): Fibres and Textiles: Dimensions of Corporate 
Marketing Structures (TD/B/C1/219). Geneva. 
(1981a): Marketing and Distribution Arrangements m 
Respect of Export and Import Transactions: Structure of 
International Trading Channels (UNCTAD/ST/MD/25). 
Geneva. 
( 1981b): Control by Transnational Corporations over Dry 
Bulk Cargo Movements (TD/B/C4/203/Rev.l). Geneva. 
(1983a): Commodity Exchanges and Their impact on the 
Trade of Developing Countries (TD/B/C1/248). Geneva. 
(1983b): Handbook of State Trading Organizations of 
Developing Countries (A/E/F/S.83/II/D.5). Geneva. 
( 1984a): The Processing before Export of Cocoa: Areas for 
International Co-operation (TD/B/Cl/PSC/18/Rev.l). 
Geneva. 
(1984b): The Processing and Marketing of Bauxite/ 
Alumina/ Aluminium: Areas for International Co-operation 
(TD/B/C.l/PSC/19/Rev.l). Geneva. 
(1984c): The Processing and Marketing of Manganese: 
Areas for International Co-operation (TD/B/C.l/PSC/ 
Rev.l). Geneva. 
(1984d): The Marketing of Hard Fibres iSisai and 
Henequén): Areas for International Co-operation 
(TD/B/C.l/PSC/21/Rev.l). Geneva. 
(1984e): The Processing and Marketing of Phosphates: 
Areas for International Co-operation (TD/B/C1/PSC/22/ 
Rev.l), Geneva. 
(1984f): The Marketing and Processing of Tea: Areas for 
International Co-operation (TD/B/C.l/PSC/28/Rev.l). 
Geneva. 
-( I984g) : The Processing and Marketing of Sugar: Areas for 
International Cooperation (TD/B/Cl/PSC/29/Rev.l). 
Geneva. 
(1984h): The Processing and Marketing of Copper: Areas 
for International Co-operation (TD/B/C. l/PSC/30/Rev. 1 >. 
Geneva. 
(1984Í): The Marketing of Jute and Jute Products: Areas 
for InternationalCo-operation (TD/B/C l/PSC/32/Rev.l). 
Geneva. 
(1984J): The Marketing and Distribution of Tin: Areas for 
International Co-operation (TD/B/C.l/PSC/38). Geneva. 
( 1984k): The Processing of Tin: Areas for International 
Co-operation (TD/B/C l/PSC/39). Geneva. 
(19841): The Marketing, Distribution and Transportation 
of Iron Ore: Areas for International Co-operation 
(TD/B/C.l/PSC/41). Geneva. 
(1984m): International Co-operation in the Field of the 
Marketing and Distribution of Commodities of Export Inter-
est to Developing Countries: Elements of a Framework 
(TD/B/C.1/252). Geneva. 
(1984n): International Co-operation in the Field of 
Processing: Elements of a Framework (TD/B/C.1/253). 
Geneva, 
(1985a): Bulletin, No. 209- February. 
(1985b): Bulletin, No. 210. March. 
United States, Department of Commerce (1984): US affiliates of 
foreign companies: operations in 1982. Survey of Current 
Business. September. 
(1985a): State roles in foreign trade. Business America. 
27 May. 
(1985b): US Direct Investment Abroad: 1982, Benchmark 
Survey data. 
(1985c): 1982 benchmark survey of US direct investment 
abroad. Survey of Current Business. December. 
Yamamura, K. ( 1976): General trading companies in Japan: their 
origins and growth. H. Patrick (éd.). Japanese Industrializa-
tion and its Social Consequences. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, pp. 161-199. 
Yeats, Alexander J. ( 1981): The influence of trade and commercial 
barriers on the industrial processing of natural resources. 
World Development, vol. 9, No. 5, pp. 485-494. 
Young, Alexander (1978): The Sogo Shosha:Japan's Multinational 
Trading Companies. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 
